The era of half-hearted, half-baked, under resourced and ill defined operations should now be over.

--former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Robert Fowler
December 1995

Peacekeeping has played a pre-eminent role in the politics and consciousness of Canadians for over 40 years; and it is no minor conceit that in the nearly 40 missions our soldiers have participated in to date, the “quintessentially Canadian characteristics of civility and compromise served operations well” (FlaGnagan 1993:1). Our contributions have been steady, sometimes innovative and until recently, well deserving of the Nobel laureate legacy they have been charged with upholding. To say that peacekeeping is the stuff of mythology, however, is increasingly becoming a reference to ambivalence and wavering commitment rather than popular enchantment. Dwindling resources (much maligned by militarists) and limited tolerance for causalities or misconduct (consistently invoked in the media) have induced an almost existential debate in the Canadian military: what, if any, is the future of our peacekeeping forces? Some equally elemental conundrums are these: if peacekeeping withers, what of Canadian internationalism? And if our historical position as a leading peacekeeper is worth preserving, what are our options to rescue this important function of our national Forces? The argument of this paper holds that, although the obstacles are many, the Canadian forces must rise to the challenge and metamorphose into a highly diversified, progressive and specialized force.

To an even greater extent, however, it behoves our political leadership to articulate the terms of this metamorphosis—ceasing and desisting of its tendency toward ambiguity.

Peacekeeping was and is integral to Canadian foreign and defence policies and a significant pillar in our global platform. In order for it to retain its relevance amidst an ever-turbulent security environment, however, the organizational philosophy, political-culture, training and education of Canadian peacekeepers must fall in step with the news demands they face. The purpose of this paper will first be to outline precisely what some of these demands are—namely, the obstacles inherent to civil—military coordination in peace support operations—followed by series of recommendations of how Canadian soldiers might best be prepared to meet them. Central to this prescription is the notion that civil—military relations must be strengthened—from the top down and back up

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1 The monument in our capital and the recent release of the new ten dollar bill, on which a Canadian peacekeeper watches over the scene with binoculars, rather than a rifle, is testimony to the power of peacekeeping myth in Canadian national culture.

2 The author is aware that this term is frequently used with derogatory connotation, but would like to emphasize that this is in no way the intended use of the term in this paper. Rather, it is used to categorize those who are advocates, supporters and members of the military, and who are more or less in favour of its traditional/conventional incarnations.

3 While the theory of civil—military relations has traditionally focused almost exclusively on the interaction between the highest actors of each realm (in this case, government officials and their counterparts in the
again-- if Canada is ever to regain its ‘comparative advantage’ in the field of peacekeeping. It is equally understood, however, that the financial and conceptual hurdles to this end are not easily surmountable.

**Legacy and Leadership**

Canada has participated in almost every United Nations Peacekeeping operation since the international organization’s inception. With a spotless record of accounts and a high level of training relative to our third world counterparts, Canadian missions are often heralded as a model UN security force. Both Louise Frechette and Robert Fowler have consistently emphasized the importance of peacekeeping to Canada’s international reputation\(^4\), and other countries have validated this assertion with their frequent referral to our training manuals and solicitation of our expertise.\(^5\)

Prior to the Somalia affair, the evolution of Canadian peacekeeping mimicked the general evolution of the global security environment. Traditionally, peacekeeping was a task which implied the containment of two inter-state aggressors, each of which were party to previously established peace-settlement, between which a strict border could be delineated, on which Canadian soldiers were invited to ‘impartially’ patrol. It was, to that extent, a child of the cold war; but with the crumbling of the Berlin wall (and some would argue even before that) operational challenges multiplied to blur the lines between peace-enforcement, peace-making and peace-building (see Bremmer Hache, 1993). The vocabulary of post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian aid was injected into policy, and accordingly, the job description of a Canadian peacekeeper expanded to include supervising elections, protecting human rights officials, escorting civilian observers or monitors, policing and delivering food as well as many other social services. In short, the Canadian forces were unwittingly ejected from the cold-war comfort of defence into the uncharted waters of conflict resolution and prevention. New tasks were expected to be completed above and beyond the traditional military obligations, and in many instances, Canadian soldiers were understandably overwhelmed\(^6\).

Given the apprehension of many military experts at the time, it is surprising that in the early nineties—at the peak of peacekeeping operations, and by prescription of Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali’s report *An Agenda for Peace*—there was animated and

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\(^4\) Evidence of this can be found on both the DFAIT, UNAC websites, as well as in articles personally attributed to them.

\(^5\) A most recent and interesting example of such solicitation was related to me by David Lochhead, of DFAIT, who is charged with the development of the Gender Mainstreaming material for Peacekeeper training. Although the material is still being revised, word has apparently gotten out and Canada has already been approached by countries like Sierra Leone to share the results. Officials from other nations are known assist in the Pearson Peacekeeping Center short-term training sessions quite regularly.

\(^6\) Reference the this sentiment of being overwhelmed is littered throughout the documentation on Somalia and Bosnia, but curiously, the soldiers I have interviewed do not express the opinion that they were incapable of handling the tasks at hand—only that they were ill-prepared to properly address them.
innovative discussion surrounding the development of even more innovative lines of peacekeeping, including but not limited to: an environmental task force, anti-crime/terrorist operations, and enhanced maritime capabilities. By this point there was little doubt that the institution was undergoing profound change, and that the term ‘peacekeeping’ was beginning to denote an ever-widening variety of exercises which had not been conceived of under the rubric of cold-war security (Carment 1999). In 1998 The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade provided the following guidelines for peacekeeping which betray just much the conceptual tides had shifted:

The overarching goal of peacekeepers is to establish conditions where people in troubled societies can resolve their conflicts and build a better future. Peacekeeping seeks to enhance human security, and can contribute meaningfully to democratic development, human rights and the rule of law. By helping others to put down their guns and manage their grievances without violence, peacekeepers are doing what the United Nations was established to do, and what Canadians believe in.

Non-violent resolution of conflict? This was certainly not the traditional domain of the soldier—or even the ‘peacekeeper’ for that matter. ‘New’ missions came to be known variably as ‘wider’ peacekeeping, military humanitarianism, peace-support or simply relief assistance operations. Yet the question remained, were Canadians properly equipped—organizationally, physically, or ethically-- to handle the style and scope of second generation peacekeeping?

With a mandate of such monumental proportions, one might be forced to wonder, as many did (see Wiseman 1993, Flanagan 1997, Hay 1998, Cohen and Moens 1999), what could be done to ensure that Canadian soldiers were sufficiently prepared to assume these multidimensional tasks. Speculation regarding the value of specialized training for peacekeeping forces was hotly debated; but was typically met with a qualified ‘no’ from military officials, followed by the now popularized sound-bite that “the best peacekeeper is a well trained soldier”.8 (Bremmer, Hache 1993, Haydon et al.). It is precisely on this point that the current critique will take issue. While there is no question that the military training peacekeepers receive instils them with the physical skills of efficiency, flexibility and reliability which are imperative to an overseas operation and to which every Defence White Paper has paid proper homage, it has been less convincing to many civilian analysts whether such training adequately reflects the humanitarian challenges a soldier will face in the new security environment—a suspicion which has been substantially reinforced by the lessons learned from ill-fated operations. Serious weaknesses within Canadian ranks, coupled with the disastrous implications for UN missions in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda where “political paralysis, financial difficulties and bureaucratic limitations” seriously eroded the credibility of peacekeeping operations, left the entire institution vulnerable (Flanagan 1997:6). With the benefit of hindsight, we are inspired to

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7 The word ‘qualified’ is met to denote that military officials did concede to some version of specialized training in the form of special sessions offered by the Pearson Peace-Keeping Center, inaugurated in 1994. However, as this paper will attest, these session have limited access and are far from comprehensive—though the conviction that regular training is sufficient for peacekeepers remains pervasive.

8 This assertion is discussed in detail in the 1994 Defense White Paper.
think ‘outside the box’ in our development of alternatives to rescue the Canadian Talisman.

Analysts have taken great pains to retrospectively appraise the value of Canadian culpability in these infamous UN failings, and in so doing, have underscored the grave deficiency of a foreign policy framework which has only vaguely articulated the goals, mandates and real capabilities of Canadian Forces abroad. Financial overstretch—or what Jockel and others have called the ‘commitment-capability gap’, is most commonly cited as the root of all peacekeeping ills. Yet there are other factors which have evaded our attention until very recently, not the least of which is the state of civil-military coordination—both in Canada and in the field; for it is in this relationship that the future effectiveness of Canadian peacekeeping resides.

Civil- military relations in the Canadian Context

Civil-military coordination is Canadian peace support operations is a topic that has yet to be studied in the analytical depth it deserves, even though infrequent negotiations on the point of humanitarianism between the two have proven dangerously explosive. The changing nature of conflict in the post-cold war era has forced a re-conceptualization of both doctrine and practice where international efforts to restore and preserve peace are concerned, and the metamorphosis has often been painful:

As it stands at the moment, Canada is attempting to define an appropriate military philosophy in a political environment divided between realist (perhaps neo-realist) and idealists perspectives on the need for military capabilities.... This process is unsettling, particularly where ideological divisions within cabinet are transferred into departmental structures... overall, this does not bode well for civil-military relations.

Things may have improved slightly since 1995, when Peter Haydon addressed these words to a conference in New Brunswick, but the tension he speaks of is a salient dynamic of the relationship even today. The only difference being that now, significantly more attention is being drawn to the ‘trickle down’ impact between strained relations ‘on top’, and civil-military coordination ‘on the ground’.

The registered list of conceptual and practical grievances from either perspective are quite high. From the rightmost end of the spectrum, the source of military resentment is clear: the stride of the political pendulum is conceived to be unfairly favouring one side. Specifically, the politico-strategic context for intervention has gravitated toward civilian alternatives, where operational requirements have favoured ‘peace-support’ over enforcement (Pugh 2000:231), and where public expectations of the military far outweigh the resources the government is prepared to dedicate to the cause. In the course

9 And interesting adjunct to this phenomenon in the growth of a pacifist grassroots movement in Canada which seeks approval for a bill which would allow Canadians to directly decide if their tax dollars should be spent on defense or peace-related activity. The groups numbers are still small, but growing, and this may be symptomatic of a greater political tendency to come.
of this forced transformation, the work of peacekeepers has more closely approximated, or in some cases totally deferred, to the work of non governmental organizations— practitioners who have a greater familiarity with post-cold war targets like famine, ecocide, the abuse of human rights, and the need to rehabilitate the conditions under which divergent ethno-religious communities coexist. Haydon, and military advocates like him, have argued that this over-emphasis on humanitarianism has “distorted the raison d’etre of the Canadian military and the capabilities it should maintain”, warning that a process of “virtual demilitarization” is under-foot which will gradually see the military totally subsumed under an ‘uninformed’ and idealistic civilian control (1995:51).

While civilian’s might find Haydon’s accusation somewhat alarmist, his quasi-survivalist plea to preserve the integrity of the institution seems quite justifiable under the potentially back-breaking reductions in defence spending, not to mention the concern over the integrity of objective military insight: for “when military advice is offered in political terms, a crucial step in the aggregate process <for managing a mission>... is lost” (Haydon 1995:57). The general conviction is that Canadians may be somewhat naive about the need for robustness “because no new enemy has yet been invented to justify maintaining huge military forces in peace time”(Legault 1997:14).

This naiveté, of course, was decidedly shattered with the events of September 11th, and the need for ‘hard’ power to confront the terrorist threat has been once again been confirmed. Yet even among the most realist observers of the conflict, the recognition that bombing alone is insufficient win the war against terrorism has been widely recognized. The language of ‘nation-building’, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and a long term involvement in Afghanistan have been invoked alongside the discourse of war, reminding us that the need for ‘soft’ options is equally salient. It is therefore not, nor can it be, a discussion of zero sum-- one more than the other (an issue with will be probed in greater depth further along in this paper). In this particular campaign, the Canadian military will be asked to be proficient in both.

One should not automatically assume that, thanks to the orientation of Canadian foreign policy toward Hunan Security, the military’s influence in defining their relationship with civilian authorities or impacting the course of operations has been utterly stifled. In many ways, the recognition that military services are not only helpful but required in humanitarian missions breathes new life into the forces; presenting them with the opportunity to reinforce their relevance under the modern security rubric. Notwithstanding, it is clear that civil-military relations in Canada are floundering precisely because a waffling and largely ambivalent political leadership has refused to deal straightforwardly—with either the public or the military itself-- on the subject of military requirements. Indeed, there has yet to be a truly open debate on the topic.

While most militarists have been prone to argue that there has been altogether too much political interference in management and operation of military affairs, Douglas Bland contends that “the relationship between the government and the defence establishment is troubled because political leaders have failed in their basic responsibility to supervise the armed forces of Canada” (Bland 1995:27). Such is the crux of problem:
in a democracy the military must always yield to the ultimate authority, the desires of the people as expressed by their political chiefs. As Captain Ron Carson expressed to this author in a recent visit to Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, “ultimately, you are a subordinate. You have to say ‘Yes Mr. Prime Minister’... A soldier will tell you how it is; politicians tell you how it should be” (April 9th, 2001). This is why, in the final analysis, it will fall to the government to solicit the appropriate change in the Canadian Forces. The sophistication of peace support operations relies on it.

The next few years will surely prove a crucial phase of negotiation between soldier and aid worker-- the unlikely bedfellows of Canadian humanitarianism-- with a number of significant obstacles to overcome. I shall consider some of the most important barriers in the next section, not as they appear in board rooms on Parliament hill, but as they translate on the ground; for this is the realm in which strained civil-military relations have their most destructive impact—in the lives of soldiers and the people they have pledged to protect.

_The Pitfalls of Coordination..._

Civil- military coordination is a requisite of any modern peacekeeping mission, and where the political and operational dispositions of soldiers and humanitarian officers collide, peace is put at risk. Recognizing this reality has prompted appeals to reform this troubled relationship, but it remains clear that the hurdles of mutual-validation are many, principally because appreciation and understanding for the utility of the other is still minimal. But it is growing. In fact, where the traditional self-concept of each may once have rested firmly in their apparent differentiation, there is now a space for a positive (if sometimes wavering) rapport:

Civil-military relations may have manifested a shift from detachment, suspicion and ignorance—where interaction was based essentially on duality of roles and culture and therefore dependent on mutual opposite-ness—towards troubled cooperation and a degree of confusion over identity and roles (Pugh 2000:229).

The relationship between soldier and aid worker is nonetheless, at best, ambivalent. The relatively recent acknowledgment that there is an identity of interests between them has certainly led to greater interaction, but as is easily imagined, the operating procedures and organizational cultures of these two branches of the Canadian humanitarian effort differ greatly (Canadian Military Journal 2000:57) and contrary to popular assumption, cannot always be resolved through strict adherence to a policy of comparative advantage and ‘complementarity’ 10. The irony here is that Canadians dedicated to encouraging peaceful co-existence between warring parties are failing to lead by example.

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10 Despite the fact that the role of peacekeepers has undeniably expanded, the notion that they have maintain the general integrity of traditional practice, and are merely ‘protecting’ humanitarian efforts in a complementary way is rampant. I insist that this is a naïve conception, because one of the key principles guiding traditional peacekeeping is impartiality, which is clearly no longer relevant once soldiers are actively engaged in humanitarian work.
Complaints and frustration emanating from the military have become a very familiar refrain: amidst the cacophony of voices which constitute the ‘NGO field’, who is most qualified and deserving of their assistance? How does the military deal with the incompetence and competition which characterizes relationships between NGOs, let alone that of the parties they purport to protect? What’s more, is that the “theatrical demeanour” and “foolhardiness” of NGO workers is intolerable to military personnel who do not share in the modus operandi that “creative chaos is preferable to botched direction” (Canadian Military Journal 2000:60); indeed, the very notion runs contrary to the organizational philosophy on which the military is rooted.

From the opposite end of the spectrum, the charges are perhaps even more scathing. Soldiers, aid workers feel, are not nearly suited for humanitarian work, “because they lack the training, expertise and appropriate policy configurations for building local capacities and accountability to local populations” (Pugh 2000:230). (This, despite the fact that soldiers are regularly engaged in such activities-- building playgrounds and schools for children, for instance, and conversing with the locals to gather intelligence and offer reassurance). Such an indictment betrays a deep distrust of the institutional motives of military officials and policy. An explanation for this attitude, offered here in the words of Hugo Slim, holds that international humanitarian organizations tend to be made up of people who have profound reservations about militarism, which impact tremendously on the capacity for confidence between them: “At a profound moral level the humanitarian has more problems with the military than the military has with the humanitarian. The result is a reticence and ambivalence on the part of the humanitarian which extends beyond questions of operational procedures to matters of ethics and identity.” (Slim p.125). Sergeant Kouri admits that the callousness of the militarist ‘survivalist’ humour—speckled with profanity and tasteless jokes--can easily be confused as an uncaring attitude which humanitarians are loath to tolerate.

That civilian agencies resist being associated with an unpopular international military force only compounds the strain on the relationship, making operations which require their cooperation all the more difficult to carry out. Such distancing frequently occurs at the behest of humanitarian pragmatists, who are conscious of the audiences to which they must play, and seemingly unconcerned by the accusation of ‘doubletalk’ which emanate from their military counterparts. With the world watching, civil-military relations of this sort are given a much wider context in which to prove and maintain a positive image and articulate the currency of their demands. Militarists particularly are still growing accustomed to the media frenzy and public scrutiny.

Composition

The gendered dynamic of these organizations may count for some of the cultural dichotomies which separate them. Despite the Canadian governments attempts at ‘gender mainstreaming’ in the Forces, the majority of enlisted soldiers are still predominantly
male, while humanitarian workers have a comparatively high proportion of women populating their ranks. Slim admits that it may be somewhat of an oversimplification to imply that chauvinism is the pre-eminent force dividing these groups, but it is clear that stereotypical versions of masculine-feminine values still play a significant role in their differentiation. Moreover, there is evidence that such gendered confrontation is cause for serious resentment among some, who blame the influence of humanitarianism and peacekeeping for the ‘feminization’ of the Forces. One can safely assume that those who invoke the latter term are using it as a euphemism for the weakening and potential impotence of the military; but one can also safely suggest that such attitudes, like the discriminatory attitudes which prop them, are symptomatic of an ignorance in desperate need of redress.

A more comprehensive study of this gendered dynamic, and the social inequities which underpin it, would surely prove revealing; as would a more profound analysis of what generally attracts an individual to one or the other type of humanitarian profession. For herein lies the crux of the debate: what kind of Canadian should be put in charge of ‘peace’? The allocation of government funding would seem to suggest the soldier, but certain experiences in the field, and the opinion of the public, does not always back this up. The image of the peacekeeper in Canadian society vs. the Canadian military is a highly distorted and problematic conception, and it needs to be cleared up.

**Mandate**

In the classic conception of peacekeeping, impartiality and consent were the fundamental tenets of any operation. The tasks of the humanitarian endeavour—with its pattern of delivering relief assistance to the ‘persecuted’—on the other hand, are viewed as severely compromising the neutrality of soldiers. Suddenly it seems as though ‘sides’ are being taken, and while this may run contrary to the official ordinances of a peacekeeping force, amongst aid workers, there is plenty of justification in taking one side. Not to mention the fact that in any given conflict, there are many sides to take, since the ‘good against evil’ matrix so popularized in our histories is simply no longer applicable. Moreover, several of the non-governmental organizations present on the scene are international and hold no specific national ties, which severely complicates the guidelines for cooperation. In such cases, good judgement, rather than strict rules of engagement, is often the most reliable compass to navigate through the chaos. But this, of course, demands an exercise in individual freedom which is not easily reconcilable to the military ethos.

Aid workers often expect soldiers to react to situations in which the latter’s hands are ‘technically’ tied by restrictive mandates. In an emergency scenario, who one chooses to help, and the methods one chooses to help them, are decisions racked by spontaneity rather than calculation—and as testimony of General Dallaire from his time in Rwanda reveals, the clashes which result between military and humanitarian workers in such circumstances can seriously threaten the delivery of proper assistance.

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11 The literature on civil-military relations often alludes to the social-psychological explanation, but never sufficiently fleshes it out. For a more in depth analysis, see the work of Sandra Whitman
Aid may also expect soldiers to come to their rescue when they assume the tasks of transportation, delivery and defence on their own but are unable to complete the job. Such ‘fool-hardiness’ and miscalculation typically spawns resentment between the two. As one soldier from CFB Petawawa recently put it “they want us to clean up their stupid messes”. Further, because the lines of communication between the two are unsteady, there are times when aid workers are in need of military support but are unable to access it. Even though soldiers who are capable of helping them might be close by, waiting idly.

**Dependency and Symmetry**

The pitfalls notwithstanding, the two side of the peace support equation need each other.

Without security being guaranteed by the military, civil implementation tends to be very difficult and may even fail completely. Secondly, the skills, knowledge and assets of the military can play an important role supporting the parties... without <it> civil implementation in complex situations is basically inconceivable... it has an essential role to play in filling the gap until the parties and civil organizations are in a position to carry the peace process forward by themselves... CIMIC <civil military coordination> is the cement that holds the building blocks of peace together (Zandee 1999:12).

Dependency, though less immediately apparent, is inherent to the relationship. Links between the two professions are undeniable, and approximate what Hugo Slim calls “a peculiar mimicry” whereby certain values such as service, courage, endurance, selflessness, organizational loyalty, adventure and prestige bespeak an almost mirror image. Indeed, even the operational language (working as an ‘officer’ in the ‘field’) is borrowed almost verbatim ( see Slim p.124). Soldiers and aid workers may frequently be engaged in the very same activities, such as the gathering of raw intelligence, the accompaniment and protection of individuals under threat, the restoration of infrastructure, disarmament, mine clearance and more—but their troubled relationship will prohibit true effective collaboration.

The symmetry they experience over the awareness that they are both subject to an intractably constraining policy and resource climate, coupled with the notion that the their collaborative services are required to truly engender peace in a ravaged security environment, is slowly opening a space for solidarity. And it is precisely on such curious points of symbiosis that a more a creative and constructive form of exchange and action should be built. In order for the proper ethic of cooperation to be engendered, however, an entirely new program of education and training must be developed that far outweighs the attempts in this direction to date. A specialized curriculum, geared specifically toward the peacekeeper, in which the issues and ethics of coordination and humanitarian missions can be effectively taught, and where dialogue between civilian and military personnel can be enhanced. This is the vision that will salvage Canadian Peacekeeping for the future.
Training versus Education

The fact that civil-military technical relations are characterized by issues of both competence and competition “treading the same path and even treading on the same toes” (Randel 1994:336) suggests that the two ends of the humanitarian spectrum have a lot to learn from each other. While military forces appear to have a huge logistical capacity which proves very handy when civilians must mobilize or be protected, it is less valuable in the context of the post-conflict reconstruction and prevention operations that peacekeepers are now faced with undertaking. Simply put, they are not only inadequately trained to provide the health, water and infrastructure programs to numbers of people beyond themselves, but are also insufficiently appraised of the political, cultural and environmental delicacies of the situations in which they serve. The problem, it seems, is that the logic of their preparedness revolves around the scenario of war rather than relief; relatively speaking, the logistics of delivering humanitarian aid are neglected in the typical soldier’s training.

That said, it is clear that civilians are incapable of delivering the appropriate aid with the speed and organization for which the military is renowned. Were this paper geared toward the latter, much could be written about the need for reform in the humanitarian ‘ranks’—particularly with regard to their general suspicion of military motives and their non-cooperation and sometimes deliberate sabotaging of military efforts. However, since the military is the target of this particular appraisal, let us focus on what can be done from that end.

Prior to the events of September 11th, 90% of Canadian Forces deployments were for ‘non-classic’ operations, and once the bombing campaign subsides, there will likely be more of these ‘atypical’ missions ahead. Under Security Council resolutions like SCR 872/05 for Rwanda, as previously alluded to, soldiers were no longer charged with traditional tasks of ‘attack with withdrawal’, but rather, they were asked to police, to be electoral officials and human rights monitors, to investigate atrocities, and to assist victims. While critics have often wondered if soldiers should be assuming these responsibilities at all, others would suggest that conclusion is foregone. Peacekeepers are doing it. The real question is whether or not they are doing it to the best of their ability, and the answer is this: given the proper education and preparedness, they could be doing it better.

Unfortunately, what training exists is triply limited by scope, accessibility and feasibility. At present, two week courses aimed at bridging the gap between civilian and military pillars of the humanitarian effort are offered at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, but as a discussion with the instructor and a few students of that course revealed, only 20 percent of Canadian Forces personnel are able to attend, and typically these are limited to higher ranking officers, who have been ‘self-selected’, and rarely see a subsequent peacekeeping mission. A further obstacle is the cost of tuition: though partial

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12 This was revealed in by the Steering Committee of Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance in Rwanda in a report which commended OXFAM for providing the appropriate technical assistance.
scholarships are available, the remaining costs are still prohibitive to the majority—not to mention the very remote location of the school at a time when the Forces are aiming to reintegrate soldiers into wider society. Related efforts to educate in the logic of coordination have been made at the international level, but without central and legal reinforcement, they will remain largely inconsequential. For instance, UNHRC has published a handbook outlining the issues of civil-military coordination, but its formal incorporation into peacekeeping training is still discretionary.

On the flipside, comparatively few civilian counterparts are known to attend the classes offered by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (though interestingly, the gender balance often falls in favour of women). This is curious, given the fact that a significant part of the mandate is to enhance this relationship. How can the centre accomplish this feat when a central constituency is severely underrepresented? The reality is that few non-governmental organizations can independently afford to sponsor their own students, and the government has neither provided alternate funding, nor insisted that such exchange be requisite for access to its purse strings.

It would admittedly be unfair to unduly chastise the Centre for its limitations, for the intentions bring all sectors of a peacekeeping mission up to speed on the challenges they face is clearly a good one, and is desperately needed:

The rapid advances of civilian society as regards educated communication and debate have not been paralleled in the Armed forces. The education of the officers and troops was focused almost exclusively in the past on pure technical military functions, which certainly favour the operational quality of our troops, but at the same time severely handicaps them in their need to adapt to contemporary society. We need soldiers who are both educated and capable of discernment within an environment where most of the time, the objective is no longer to conquer or destroy but rather to construct and to participate in building peace. (Legault 1997:40)

Albert Legault, like his academic contemporary Roger Haycock, does an exceptionally thorough job of highlighting the weaknesses apparent in the military educational system, but stops short of underscoring the severe lack of professional preparedness of the average soldier in the field. CIMIC courses in the United States deal mainly with that end of the spectrum, owing to the recognition that it is non-commissioned officer who is most likely to effect and be affected by the troubling relationship. Although there is an assumption in military logic that only the leadership corps needs to be properly informed of the political intricacies of any operation, this author remains suspicious of the conviction that in matters of such sophisticated education/training, a ‘trickle down’ effect will automatically occur. This is particularly troubling since we know that there are also serious gaps which exist between various ranks within the military itself, which are not easily negotiated through the culture of

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13 Racine maintained that low enlistment amongst civilians could be blamed on the excessive ‘technical’ nature of the course, as it is delivered in typical military style. This also suggests, however, that the emphasis is usually placed on the practicalities of civilian-military coordination—which is called CIMIC—rather than some of the more delicate aspects, such as ethics and perception.
command. Today’s soldier simply cannot be expected to behave in the manner befitting a peacekeeper unless she/he has been properly schooled in that character. Thus, it behoves the government and the military, together, to offer the proper incentives to that end.

Legault recommends that a forum for higher learning be created in order to introduce senior civilian and military officials to CIMIC issues in democracies incipient or in transition; this submission will go further by arguing for the addition of non-commissioned officers and the humanitarian aid workers the target group—those who are manifestation of the civil-military relationship on the ground—with the understanding that this would add an important and rightful dimension to the required transformation. After all, it is these men and women who are tasked with the sensitive details of a mission, do they not deserve to have a better understanding of what they are doing there? Surely they would also benefit from the skill set that such an educational program would purvey.

Why Change?... Burden Sharing, Recruitment and Canadian Ethics.

There are a number of very compelling reasons for the military to engage in such a transformation, not the least of which has already been discussed at length. That is, the reality of a security environment in which Peacekeepers are dispatched to complex theatres of operation, which, in the interest of operational efficiency, require new sets of tools and highlight the need for cooperation with humanitarian actors. Another factor is less apparently pragmatic, but has analytical resonance nonetheless: the question of accurately reflecting Canadian values, rather than trying to keep in ‘defensive’ step with the United States.

Knowing, as Noel Iverson tells us, that the ethical outlook of a standing military order is a micro-reflection of society’s ethical outlook—what sort of military do we imagine would echo Canadian internationalist ethics? This is a question which, although never asked overtly, seems to underpin much of the scholarship which concerns the future of our national Forces. What does the particularly Canadian security rubric look like? Pacifists wonder whether there is room for a military at all, and with good reason: despite having been involved in six foreign wars and contributing to more than three dozen peacekeeping operations, Canada remains devoid of any substantial military-political culture (Hayden 2:51). Moral ambivalence seems the order of the day, for Canadians are generally uncomfortable with militarism generally; yet as Friedmann and Fortmann have shown, public opinion has remained steadfastly attached to the concept, if not the conduct, of peacekeeping. (1995:397).

Public opinion may not always play a significant role in foreign policy process, but peacekeeping is the ardent exception to this rule. Policy-makers are often faced with

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14 Much has been said to the author about the danger of ‘educating a soldier too much’, the risks of which run somewhat contrary to the culture of command which underpins a military philosophy. Still, it remains unclear whether or not simply transmitting more information, and providing soldiers with extra ‘tools’ of communication and interaction would have the undesired effect of encouraging insubordination. It is a causal link that deserves some re-examination.
tough choices regarding how to satiate the public desire for a continued role in military humanitarianism while addressing the increasingly pacifist political culture of our nation. Clearly, the answer lies in a new type of Peacekeeper altogether. A new form of militarism would be that which reflects both the soft power of popular imagination, and the ‘hard power’ of the logistical support that requires—that is, the physical, logistical and defensive capabilities to properly deliver a mission. For in practice, these two dimensions simply cannot be separated. Superior judgment, based on the ethics of humanitarianism rather than confrontation, would have to be imbued in the ranks: because “soldiers cannot be morally responsible agents if they are treated as mere instruments of war” (Iverson 19).

A more pro-active prioritizing of peacekeeping—its promotion, its relevance and its preparedness—would do much to redeem the military in the public’s eyes, and defeat what Bratt calls “donor fatigue”. It has certainly worked in the past: according to Stephen Dale, “at a time when the government desperately needed a rationale for spending a huge chunk of the federal budget on the military, peacekeeping, the stuff of national pride to many Canadians, has become the perfect smoke screen in a clever political ploy...” (Dale 1993:12). At very least, fiscal desperation will surely prove more than enough impetus to explore this trajectory. With a mandate with falls is better step with the humanitarian agenda, the Canadian International Development Assistance branch might also be persuaded to share some of the budgetary burden.

The recent crisis of recruitment foretells a new approach between the Canadian forces and the society which it serves. Stubborn attachment to an organizational philosophy which is no longer salient to the minds of citizens will only hinder the military’s replenishment. An awareness campaign should be launched alongside (or perhaps as part) of the current info-mercial bid for recruitment; and even more importantly, the media needs to be brought back onside. Once the Canadian public becomes aware of the important distinctions which currently obscure security euphemisms, they will realize that we are not just putting money toward bombs, but toward peace support operations which are an integral part of our commitment to liberal internationalism. A young generation, who are increasingly disillusioned with global politics, will be drawn to the ranks because they will believe, correctly, that the Canadian Forces are not simply organized killers, but composed of a well-trained, well educated group of individuals who defend principles as well as people.

Growing Pains...

Not surprisingly, an institution which relies so heavily on a foundation of tradition and rigidity will find it exceptionally difficult to adjust to such demands. Nevertheless, some analysts are beginning to appreciate how this may be to the military’s advantage:

“... the institutionalization of ‘humanitarianism’ in military doctrine, mandates, discourse and structures may be placing military establishments in a hegemonic position that determines the framework of future civil-military relations... a process may be at work, whereby the greater the involvement of military forces in Human rights and relief
work, the more civilianized military establishments will be come, making them more transparent and accountable in their operations, bringing them closer to civilian needs and, in the process, putting substance behind the humanitarian images that the military forces aim to portray. (Pugh 2000:238)

Despite many advances designed to enhance operational performance in the field, little has yet been claimed in the area of attitudinal and philosophical development. Indeed, the lack of precedent for such adaptation is disappointing. Malcolm argues that at best, the military has had an “uneven record” of organizational learning, and that changes in “core beliefs, values and structure have not occurred alongside procedures and routines” (Malcolm 1992:96). The collective failure of senior leaders to properly adapt to and address challenges has left lower ranking soldiers confounded with often disastrous results, such as carrying the ethical burden for incidents such as Somalia: “no officer apologized for the state and actions of the <Canadian Forces> in Somalia and no officers called for a broom to sweep the forces clean.” (Bland 1995:31). Where civil-military relations need to be reformed, so do the ranks of the military itself--- but not without the help of their political leadership.

Fusion

In our redefinition of the ‘soul and role’ of the military, we are nonetheless ill-advised to place the entire burden on the Forces themselves. Indeed, the government should accept its share of the load—which may in fact be greater. Legault summarizes it well in his report to the Minister of National Defence (Doug Young):

Politicians are largely ignorant of military matters, and the military’s ignorance of politics is just as deplorable. In what Dunlap calls “post-modern militarism”, he mentions that the military is not in the least bit troubled by the authoritarian society in which they live. On the contrary, they cherish the harmony it provides, while neither admiring nor wanting the no-holds barred individualism that civilian society enjoys.... as a result, the military’s commitment to the democratic political process is “extant but abstract”. The solution to these problems is not to further separate these two meritocracies—that of the civilians, founded on education and knowledge, and the military one, based on experience and military bravery—but rather to unite them to a greater extent (Legault 1997:18)

A similar parallel is drawn on the ground. The relationship between the “vertical” structure of the military and the more “horizontal” structure of civilian operations may seem entirely impossible to reconcile smoothly, and there are clear advantages to each operating independently. Nevertheless, once the harmony of specialization and comparative advantage gives way to competitiveness over resources and command (which it often does) the integrity of a humanitarian operation is severely threatened.

In some instances, military cooperation with NGOs has been very smooth and positive. In others it has not. The difference between the two seems to lie in the
degree to which peace support forces established structures for regular information sharing and consultation (MacFarlane 23).

Kouri has said that the greatest benefit of open communication is the understanding it cultivates between parties. Though potentially, it also opens a space for progressive dialogue on the necessary requirements for an effective ‘peace-force’. In practical terms, the transformation requires the mainstreaming of both qualitative and technical coordination. Educational programs relating to the humanities would be a consistent aspect of officer training, for example, and it would behove the leadership corps to systematically disseminate the logic throughout the ranks. Since the use of force is a most disfavoured (and constrained) option in a peacekeeping mission, it would also be worthwhile to train soldiers in the strategies and tactics of non-violent conflict de-escalation.

This latter point, in fact, is where collaboration with humanitarian aid workers might prove particularly valuable, because many of them (Peace Brigades international, Michigan Peace Teams, and the Nonviolent Peaceforce to name but three) offer training sessions in conflict transformation which include the tactics and strategies for de-escalation through the use of voice, body language, physical non-cooperation with aggressors, handling the media, photo/video documentation of conflict zones and more. These are precisely some of the skills which are increasingly required in today’s operations, as well as by the political volition of the Canadian populace, each of which calls for a clear exercise in morality. The military might also consider facilitating the cross training of individuals, both by allowing officers leaves of absence so they could serve with humanitarian organizations, and permitting humanitarian workers to advise in their educational development. Indeed, bilateral consultations of that nature, including regular conferences and information sharing—both at headquarters and in the field—should become a standardized part of operation and training. For it is only when the proper space for coordination is created that this crucial relationship will improve.

Progressive Specialization...

There is an amazing opportunity presenting itself before the Canadian Forces, although the barriers, it must be said, are far more then simply conceptual. It may be trite to say that Duane Bratt is right on the money when he warns us that Niche Peacekeeping for Canada is not without its costs (1999:76). Jockel’s work Hard Power Soft Choices is a rather poignant plea to government to cease deploying soldiers who are improperly prepared “to ‘fight’ an array of moving targets”. That ‘soft power’ is slowly subsuming the entire utility of the military is a pervasive concern in military ranks; what is perhaps even concerning, however, is the way in which the debate frames ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ as necessarily opposite and exclusive, rather than the mutually re-enforcing dimensions of power that Joseph Nye originally intended they be. Even the Human Security agenda relies heavily on military backing; as Axworthy’s brainchild DART betrays, “coercive humanitarianism” is the order of the day (Chan 1997-37). Canada’s understanding of the world should not preclude the need for force, it should only dissuade from its use—to
assume otherwise is politically and practically naive. Still, as we have seen with the discourse over our commitment to Afghanistan, when the war is over, nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction will begin. It is increasingly becoming part and parcel of any offensive. Once the need for combative forces subsides, a force to promote, protect and in many ways even nurture the peace will be introduced; and at that point, Canada may be uniquely poised to emerge as a forerunner. So we see that specialized training and education, leading to the creation of particular forces commissioned to respond to respective phases of a peace support operation, may the vision of the future.

Eventually, this solution may even culminate in the development of an entirely separate operational force. Although the discussion is perhaps pre-maturely introduced here, it is worth noting that it is in the interest of the military to sanction such a transformation, because it would not only enhance the political relevance of the Canadian Armed Forces, thereby redeeming it in the eyes of public opinion and rendering them more benevolent with the allocation of their tax dollars towards a defence budget, but sharpen the skills of our forces to the extent that we would be the envy of the world. Whereas a great deal of attention has been paid to questions of deployment: more rapid and selective engagement, with proper guidelines and sophisticated equipment—comparatively little has been paid to the qualitative, moral, political and psychological dimensions of the questions: “Why are we here? What, exactly, should we be prepared to do?” And most significantly, what kind of military do Canadians want to do the job? In the minds of military leadership, Peacekeeping is still considered a second order task.

**Conclusion**

*The grim fact is that we prepare for war like giants and for peace like pigmies.*

- **Lester B Pearson**

  in his Nobel Prize Lecture, 1957

As we have heard reiterated more times than we can count, the end of the cold war saw a profound change in the global security environment. Along with it, has been a profound—if unsolicited—shift in the job description of the Canadian soldier. Peacekeepers in particular are faced with tasks which have far less to do with being a buffer between warring factions, and far more to do with realm conflict resolution and prevention. Quite justifiably, many doubts have been raised over whether or not the tasks which go along with it—collecting information on human rights abuses, working closely with refugees, the victims of abuse and rape, or delivering humanitarian assistance, should really be handled by a soldier. After all, a soldier has been trained for combat, not social work. But the query of this paper was not whether or not Canadian soldiers should be doing that sort of job—that point is already moot. That’s exactly the sort of job they are doing, and so the real question is: are they doing it well, and can they be doing it better?

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15 I believe this is a realization that is evident in the discourse on peacekeeping in the United Nations generally, as well as in Canada. It stems from an appreciation—post Rwanda— that it is simply foolhardy to insist that soldiers, for the sake of neutrality, remain disengaged from the action no matter what the circumstance. Developing guidelines for proper engagement is the current challenge on this front.
Research reveals that there is definite room for improvement, particularly in the realm of civil-military coordination—not just in the upper echelons of command and control, between DND and parliament Hill, but on the ground, with the peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers who carry out the sensitive details of peace support operations, and who have a tremendous impact on their success or failure. Thus, the Civil military relationship needs to be reformed at all levels. But there are significant obstacles to overcome, most especially: the will and the means. Unless the government dedicates the resources to facilitate the metamorphosis, and the military sheds some of its conservatism for the sake of operational effectiveness, the vision which will sustain a Canadian Talisman will be thwarted.

There are, of course, a number of compelling reasons for the transformation to occur: first, with Canada’s tenure on the Security Council now over, Canada must drive its humanitarian agenda in alternate forums; second is the need to develop new skill sets to properly address the new security environment; third, is a question of efficiency: humanitarian and military organizations, and the Peace they bring with them, is increasingly dependent on their coordination, fourth, is the issue of survival: without the leadership on both civilian and military ends of command emerge to put forward a new vision, one that inspires Canadians to recruitment and to pay proper financial homage to the value of the Canadian Forces, the institution of peacekeeping may dwindle into utter irrelevance, bringing Canada’s international reputation as a leading peacekeeper down with it.

The revolution in peacekeeping has been spawned by a revolution in the very conceptualization of peace—and the intersection of civilian and military operations occurs precisely at its most controversial dimension: humanitarianism. Canadians have been ambivalent about their desire to respond to the needs of warring societies, at once supporting the deployment of the military, but wishing that they could behave in a manner which was decidedly more ‘civil’. In Somalia, the military warned Canadian bureaucrats that our peacekeepers were unsuitable for the task (Haydon 1995:53), but does that mean we should not have gone in, or rather, that we should have prepared our soldiers better? The argument here sides with the latter logic. A more substantive framework for civil military interaction needs to be developed which would harness the potential of this essential alliance, open a space for constructive dialogue, and disseminate the lessons of the troubled relationship throughout the ranks.

At the end of the day, what Canadians want is what they should get. Such is the basis of civil-military relations in a democracy, as Huntington would remind us. Thus, it behoves our government to flex its political muscle and terminate this institutionalized ambivalence. And they should do so soon:

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16 It was beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the requirements of multifaceted reform at the level of political control and national defense command, although such a metamorphosis is central to the cultivation of the modern Canadian soldier. For a detailed discussion, please refer to Douglas Bland “The government of Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces: a Troubled Relationship”.
The mythology that Canadians are united in their support for peacekeeping and that the simple use of the term will garner support no longer seems so certain. As scepticism and concern with the bottom line grow, there is a great need to define our values, policies and interests specifically. In short, Canada’s unquestioning infatuation with peacekeeping appears to be giving way to a more mature and considered relationship, replete with all the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the international system of the late 20th century. As in all passages from innocence to experience, however, the going is unlikely to get any better. (Ann Flanagan 1993:11).

It may seem utterly contrary to fashion a soldier who symbolizes both military might and civilian sensibility-- just as foreign, perhaps, as it might have originally seemed to conceive of a soldier keeping ‘peace’. As in the time of Pearson, we have come to a point where militarism in Canada is being re-defined, but this time, its new conception is a matter of survival.

Canada is in a unique position to assume a leadership role in the domain of civil-military relations. Yet we lag considerably behind our southern neighbours in the field of CIMIC training. We have, to a limited extent, taken the seminal step toward the transformation of training through the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre-- though these short-term, technical courses do not have the breadth or the accessibility befitting the revolution in military affairs. Thus far, the majority of “Civ-mil” sessions have focused almost exclusively on the uppermost echelons of each sphere, that is, in the realm of command and control. Sorely absent is any commentary on the ‘troubled’ relationship as it exists in actual operations, or most conspicuously, the responsibility of the leadership to facilitate and encourage the proper dynamic of cooperation on the ground. For in the end, a peacekeeper—of any rank—should not be a ‘grunt with a gun’, but a refined, well educated individual who is adequately equipped to meet the challenges of a new security era.

17 According to Luc Racine, many of our officers who wish to receive more substantial training will eventually go to the USA.
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