A BLUE PRINT
FOR THE
CANADIAN FORCES’ ROLE IN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
IN THE
21ST CENTURY
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“... how can a person who knows that the soul is indestructible... kill anyone or cause anyone to kill?” ...when Krishna [God] orders fighting, it must be concluded that violence is for supreme justice...”
King Arjuna to Lord Krishna on the Battlefield at Kuruksetra
(from Text 21 and purport The Bhagavad-Gita -[As It Is])

Introduction:

A decade after the collapse of the Soviet empire the international community continues to face local and regional ‘brush fire’ wars to resolve the suppressed ambitions of Cold War repression. It can be argued that the world community will face at least another 15-20 years of this type of low level conflict.

In an attempt to stop or control these conflicts multilateral military power has been projected more often in the last decade, than in the previous forty five years, through the United Nations, NATO and other international organizations. Outside of peacekeeping and self-defense, modern international law rejects inter-state violence as a way of resolving international or intra-national disputes. Yet in the last decade it has become clear that the use of force to intercede in what are considered internal matters of a state has become common, and to some extent even accepted. Examples such as Somalia 1992, Haiti 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993- present, Sierra Leone 1997, Zaire 1998, and more recently Serbia (Kosovo) 1999 reflect this growing reality. In many cases theses conflicts are not amongst state players, but amongst rival factions or warlords within the remains of a state structure. This situation creates a dilemma for those nations committing peacekeepers to these regions as it is unclear who are the actual actors to be separated.

What is apparent at the close of the twentieth century, is that the international community moved to enforcement of internal state disputes where there is not only a general threat to the international community, be it economic, military or self-interest of participating nations, but also where issues of human security are concerned.

As former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, outlined in An Agenda for Peace, the days of “absolute and exclusive sovereignty” no longer exists. We are now in a world of peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace making, preventive diplomacy and ultimately post-conflict peace building. In this vein, Canada has and is playing a major role as a so called respected “middle power” through her role in international peacekeeping operations and as a member of multilateral operations like IFOR and SFOR. But in a future of ‘brush fire’ wars can Canada’s small military forces retain an active role in UN or other multilateral operations?

It is clear that the Human Security Agenda of the government is closely tied to foreign policy and defense policy, but it is equally clear that the Canadian Forces (CF) does not have the capability to fulfil the role outlined by the linkages of these policies. The impact of these policies has left the CF involved in peacekeeping while its war-fighting capability has been eroded, thus making the CF ineffective as a standing army or as a peacekeeping force. Yet within these policy linkages there seems to be a clear move by the present government to re-orient the CF towards a primary task of peacekeeping while relegating war-fighting to a secondary role.
Given this premise, it is useful to look at the option that the CF should be oriented towards one goal, that of peacekeeping. In this vein a blueprint will be offered to outline a framework for the CF so that it can fulfil the role of a peacekeeper, as per foreign policy dictates, while limiting its expenditures in the war-fighting role.

Framework

A brief review will discuss the linkages between foreign, defense and security policy in the post-Cold War era in Canada, and the consequence of the political reasoning behind these linkages. An appraisal of the managerial impacts of these linkages will offer insight into how the CF has tried to adapt and evolve to a duel role agenda (that of a peacekeeper and a traditional war-fighting role) as dictated by the government, and how this has fundamentally eroded the CF’s ability to function effectively (due to manpower shortages, equipment deficiencies and under-funding) in either environment. Through this discussion insight will be offered on how the Liberal government has subtly oriented the CF towards a peacekeeping force. Based on this last premise, a blueprint will be offered to look at modifying the CF to the primary task of peacekeeping within the present foreign policy objectives of Human Security while relegating war-fighting to a secondary role.

A Brief Background to Canada as a Peacekeeper and Policy Linkages:

The outline for future peacekeeping activities provided by Boutros-Boutros Ghali in An Agenda For Peace delineates the role that Canada could play in the future on the global stage, continuing the long tradition started by Lester B. Pearson.

The genesis of peacekeeping are Canadian. Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson created the concept to resolve the conflict in the Suez Canal in 1956. Professor Norman Hiller in a public forum on Canadian Peacekeeping stated that “Peacekeeping has become indelibly attached to the Canadian international image, and both are characterized as Pearsonism.” Since Suez, Canada has been involved in almost every UN peacekeeping operation with either observers, civilian police, or military forces. Canadian troops have been involved in operations as diverse as keeping the peace in Cyprus for some thirty years to supporting the democratic elections in Cambodia or providing humanitarian relief in Somalia. This in part has spawned the “middle power” myth in Canada and has become an integral part of foreign policy decision making. Given that Canada could never be a major security power, past governments have gone to great lengths to propagate the “middle power” status, but this is a flawed position, as Adam Chapnick notes “Canada will continue to promote itself as a middle power, but the concept of middlepowerhood, upon which it depends for moral and political affirmation, is mere rhetoric- words carefully manipulated to promote Canada as more powerful than it is.”

Yet, there is a distinct national mythology that has perpetuated the Canadian belief of Canada as a compassionate middle power and peacekeeper. According to a 1999 DND survey 92%of Canadians “believe it is important for the CF to be able to protect human rights in fragile democracies.” In fact there is a distinct ethos amongst the Canadian electoral public, even in the glare of the Somalia and Rwanda tragedies, that Canada’s military role is that of a benign peacekeeper rather than a major military power. And as one pundit notes, “the peacekeeping tradition has spawned a sort of national mythology in Canada.” So how is peacekeeping, the military and the
associated policies intertwined to give this impression to the average Canadian?

The Canadian Policy Context

From the numerous UN activities Canada is involved in, and the subsequent cost to the Canadian tax payer, it is obvious that the objectives of foreign policy are intermeshed with defense and security policy. Historically, Canada’s defense policy has been generally the same since the end of World War II— that is Canada has sought security through collective agreements, the nation has not remained neutral, there have been significant retrenchments of the military after major conflicts, ie the World Wars, Korea, and the Gulf War, and there has been a systematic reduction in the strength and capability of the Canadian military establishment.

Keeping the above in mind, the present corner stones that form the basis of Canada’s defense/security policy were outlined in the 1994 Defense White Paper and re-iterated in the DND 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. The military has been directed to maintain (1) multi-purpose, combat capable land, sea and air forces for the defence of Canada, (2) while contributing to the defence of North America, and (3) contributing to international peace and security. It is relevant to quote point three, which states that “it remains in Canada’s strategic interests to maintain combat capable forces able to participate in military operations in a war-fighting capacity when and if necessary to do so.” This last statement tends to imply that the use of the CF in a war-fighting role will be limited in the future.

The future policy has been outlined by DND in its document Strategy 2020, which states that “the Defence mission is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.” Strategy 2020 goes on to point out that the following Canadian “values” are to be “defended”:

(1) democracy and the rule of law;
(2) individual rights and freedoms as articulated in the Charter;
(3) peace, order and good government as defined in the Constitution; and
(4) sustainable economic well being.

In context of points 2 and 3, the CF is limited to support the Departments of Immigration, Oceans and Fisheries, the Solicitor General’s Office and the RCMP. But, in context of the events of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent changes in security policy the CF clearly could play a greater role in non-traditional military threats— thus obviating the need for a war-fighting capability. This was already reinforced by Strategy 2020 Objective 7: Strategic Partnerships which plans to "Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives" by undertaking five-year targets of “joint planning with Other Government Departments, where appropriate, to achieve synergies and efficiency.”

The present conundrum that DND faces is the requirement to do the three distinct military tasks outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper with limited resources, with war-fighting as the lowest priority on the totem pole (something that we shall return to later). To understand the context of this situation we must first review the linkages of defence and security policy to foreign policy.

There are three key foreign policy objectives of the Canadian government as outlined by the
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT): (1) The promotion of prosperity and employment; (2) The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and (3) The projection of Canadian values and culture. Tied to this is the new paradigm of Human Security, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy stated:

“The language of security extends beyond defending sovereignty and the rights of states. It encompasses freedom of expression and forced migration, internally displaced persons and war-affected children.”

Given that three of the five key components of the Human Security Agenda (see Appendix 1), the Protection of Civilians, Peace Support Operations, and Conflict Prevention, by default require the participation of the CF, the idea of human security appeals to the government’s middle power position and thus the role of the benign peacekeeper. DFAIT points out that Human Security includes “in extreme cases, where other efforts have failed—intervention to protect populations at risk.” And in this context David Pratt, M.P. notes that the principles of Human Security have “significantly changed the discourse of international relations, including important aspects of defense policy and planning.” Harkening back to Boutros-Boutros Ghali and An Agenda for Peace, and given the nature of the types of conflicts that have fostered the creation of the Human Security concept it is clear to even the most uninformed that there has to be a military component to these types of operations, but a component that is not a war-fighting capability.

It has also been argued by some that the Human Security paradigm should be viewed as a “perspective” rather than a policy. And that in this context modern militaries should understand that the conflicts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries include such concepts as human rights, humanitarianism, and governance, not just force of arms. This type of scenario “will meet the domestic political challenges and operational imperatives of modern security operations.” Clearly this is not the traditional war-fighting scenario as envisioned by military commanders of the past—but it is peacekeeping/peace enforcement/peace building. So whether we chose to see Human security as a ‘policy’ or ‘perspective’ it clearly implies some sort of peace support operational role for the CF.

Given the traditional leanings of foreign policy and DFAIT towards the UN, while defence policy and DND had inclinations towards NATO and military ties with the Americans and Canada’s other western allies, the Human Security Agenda has clearly brought foreign and defence policy closer. The general move by NATO, the US and he UN towards Human Security has eased the contradiction between the two policy standpoints, as the Acting Dean of Arts of the Royal Military College noted, “this long-standing schizophrenia in Canadian external relations has been ameliorated.”

But there are critics to the Human Security Agenda and its relevance in the “real” world as a policy tool. As the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs noted;

“The concept of ‘human security’ has become central to Canada’s foreign policy in recent years, yet it still needs to be more fully explored, defined and developed. Humanitarian intervention as a basis for international action is still an evolving concept that lacks a clear, internationally-accepted definition.”

What the Senate Committee fails to point out is that Canada does not exist in a bubble, Globalization and all the problems that it brings are likely to effect Canada, thus there is further
imperative on foreign policy makers to re-enforce the ‘middle power’ status of the country, however false it may be. Thus multi-lateral interventions and actions seem to be the obvious answer—the Human Security Agenda as crude as it may be is a powerful policy tool which used efficiently can be an effective tool in an age where hard choices need to be made in relations to government expenditures.\textsuperscript{18}

The Government had made this clear some years before when it stated that, “\textit{more and more, the concept of security is focusing on the economic, social and political needs of the individual. In tackling these issues, we will require clarity in our thinking about sources of each threat and problem, and about which combination of instruments-including development cooperation, trade liberalization and, if need be, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping-best able to address them.}”\textsuperscript{19} Clearly, defence was the lowest priority in the decision making process while economic issues were a priority (which is still true today). This not only applied to foreign policy, but also to defence policy.

The 1994 Defence White Paper goes into great length about the economic implications of Canadian foreign policy, and special attention is given to the enduring relationship with the United States. And as was pointed out by an Air Command summary of the 1994 Defence White Paper, the policies it outlined were those of fiscal restraint on the CF.\textsuperscript{20} As the White Paper notes in the section titled “Constraints on Policy Making:”

\textit{“Advanced industrial states themselves face considerable uncertainty at home, which complicates their ability to cope with global security challenges. Many Western economies are still characterized by relatively high unemployment, volatile currencies, and large accumulated national debts. The trend toward globalization, exemplified by the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is balanced by an increasing preoccupation with domestic challenges. At a time of diminishing resources, little money is available to deal with the demands of post-industrial society - the need to repair obsolescent infrastructure, protect and foster a sustainable environment, care for an aging population, improve job training and reform entitlement programs - let alone military priorities in various regions of the world. Canada and most other NATO allies have seen their military budgets decline, acknowledging the fundamental changes on the world scene and the need to reduce overall government expenditures.”}\textsuperscript{21}

Within a year of the release of the White Paper, Finance Minister, Paul Martin indicated that by fiscal year 1997-98 the DND budget would be reduced by $1.6 billion,\textsuperscript{22} the largest reduction of any government department. The fiscal reality is that as of 1998 defence spending represented 1.1\% of GDP, which was the second lowest in NATO (Luxembourg is the lowest), which in real terms means that Canada was spending 42\% less than the average spent by other NATO members or similar western style militaries like Australia.\textsuperscript{23}

In short economics is the issue that brings the discussed linkages into perspective, defence and security policy have a lower priority than the economic betterment of Canada. The impact of the deficit-and-debt problem has forced Canadian governments since the 1980s to focus on balancing the budget, which has led to severe funding cutbacks in areas such as defence. The Liberal government
made it clear that defence policy “must be cognizant of fiscal realities and the ongoing need for effective public spending.” But, the government than went on to note in its 2000 Federal Budget announcement that “funding for the next three years [2001-2003] has been increased to improve National Defence’s ability to participate in peacekeeping activities...” There still appears to be a distinct emphasis on a peacekeeping force rather than war-fighting capability.

So keeping the economic imperative in mind, the ties to the stated goals of Canadian foreign policy and security policy are clear as the government states that “the promotion of global peace as the key to protecting our security remains a central element of our foreign policy.” The actions of Canada since the end of the Cold War, such as involvement in the Gulf War, a dramatic increase in UN commitments, participation in NATO operations including IFOR, the various embargo’s against the former Yugoslavia, SFOR, and KFOR, have certainly reinforced this intermingling of foreign and defense policy. Thus peacekeeping/enforcement, rather than war-fighting, has become a key element of foreign policy, as stated by the government; “The UN continues to be the key vehicle for pursuing Canada’s global security objectives...The success of the UN is fundamental, therefore, to Canada’s future security” and by the Minster of Defence, Art Eggleton, “the Canadian Forces is a vital instrument for translating Canada’s commitment to international peace, stability and human security into action... With actions, the men and women of the Canadian Forces promote on the world stage our values of peace, tolerance and respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” Ultimately the government states that “protecting our security must go beyond military preparedness,” the underlying assumption is that we require a military and that our military is prepared. But the question remains— prepared for what?

The Political Context

From a political perspective, the peace dividend of the post-Cold War era has failed to bring improvement in the lives of the majority of the people of the world. More intra-state conflicts have broken out since the end of the 1980s then in the previous forty years, conflicts that have proven to be as devastating to local populations as had interstate war. This has changed the dimension of international relations and thus foreign policy decision making in Canada.

The Conservative era that ended in the early 1990s has been labeled as a period where Canada had “lost its way” in terms of foreign policy. A critique of this period states that Canada under the leadership of Mulroney and the Conservatives was “a disoriented and dependent society with little or no coherent, or sensible, appraisal of its foreign policy actions coming from Parliament or Canadian society.” Canada had a unique opportunity to break away from the Cold War policy bonds, but instead moved closer than ever to the Americans. As images of Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan singing “when Irish eyes are smiling” faded in the memories of Canadians, the cost to defense policy was a greater involvement in UN and multi-lateral military operations (see Appendix 2). As Stephen Lewis, Canada’s Ambassador to the UN stated in 1989, “our policy on any day depends on what the Americans tell us it should be.” The political perspective can be best exemplified by Canada’s support of United States during the Gulf War and the massive involvement in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s.

Yet at the same time the Tory government as a reaction to worsening economic outlooks downsized the CF and reduced the operating budget of DND (see Appendix 3) which limited the CF’s
ability to continue numerous operations, something that the Liberals continued. One of great policy contradictions of this time was the re-evaluation of Canada’s NATO role with the withdrawal of Canadian military forces from Europe—as this action on the surface reduced Canada’s influence amongst other NATO members, which put into question the whole “middle power” conceptualization devised by previous governments. The recent review of NATO and Peacekeeping by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs pointed out that at the time of the pull-out MP Bruce George, the Chair of the Defence Committee in the British House of Commons, commented that a country like Canada was not pulling is weight and the decision to pull out of Germany was characterized as short-sighted.\(^{33}\) And as Major General (Ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie later pointed out that even if Canada brought all its troops home it still could not fulfil the mandate outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper.\(^{34}\) The withdrawal from Europe is important in that it signaled the end of Canada’s direct involvement in a clear war-fighting scenario, thus leaving the political door open for a move towards a more peacekeeping oriented foreign policy, something that the Liberal had already outlined in their “Red Book.”

As the Liberals came into power in 1993, there was an effort to by the new government to distance itself from the rudderless foreign policy efforts of the Conservatives and thus chart a new course for Canada’s future foreign policy, and by default defence and security policy. The Red Book and the subsequent 1994 White Paper on Defence created the outline for a new era for the CF and DND—well on paper at least. Peacekeeping was a primary agenda of the Red Book promises:

1. to strengthen Canada’s leadership role in international peacekeeping,
2. to give priority to Canadian efforts to improve UN peacekeeping policies and operations,
3. to reorient Canadian defense policy and procurement practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping,
4. to create a special brigade and train both military and non-military personnel of this brigade for multifunctional UN peacekeeping task, and
5. to convert surplus military bases into peacekeeping training centres.

No real fundamental change occurred, defence spending continued to decline, regular force manpower was reduced by 2000 to a ceiling of 60,000 personnel, but the tempo of operations continued to wither the CF’s ability to conduct missions of any kind. The government also made it clear that Canada was no longer going to commit to each and every peacekeeping mission that came up, but would now select missions based on the CF’s capabilities and government imperatives. It has been argued that the reasoning behind this fundamental change towards peacekeeping was the need to deal with domestic economic issues.\(^{35}\) This process played out by the decisions relating to procurement and replacement of old equipment—as exemplified by the cancellation of the much needed EH-101 helicopters.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the Liberals have not fulfilled their rarified promises of the Red Book. It remains to be seen if Canada has taken a leading role in peacekeeping, but the advent of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine in the late 1990s combined with the Human Security Agenda are moves in the right direction in terms of the Reb Book promises of improving peacekeeping policies and operations. These policies are also concrete evidence of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, view of the use of ‘soft power’ and taken together are an indication of a reorientation towards a military that is being designed for peacekeeping rather than war-fighting. In the present context of mixed roles for the CF it still remains to be seen how viable this reorientation is.
At the end of the day the CF is still a war-fighting entity rather than a peacekeeping force—thus it is obvious why the government has not created a special brigade of military and non-military volunteers for UN operations. Though CFB Cornwallis was converted into the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, it is a far cry from the proposal put forth before the election. No other bases have been converted for the express purpose of peacekeeping training, thus the monetary dividend from these base closures and reformations has not materialized. This leaves the CF with less training facilities and even fewer cash resources with which to upgrade or replace old equipment.

Ultimately, part of the political problem may lay in the fact that most MPs and senators are truly uninformed of defence matters. Dr. Douglas Bland, talking about the political environment regarding defence issues, makes a succinct point based on analysis from a recent Queen’s University survey of MP’s and Senator’s “interests, attitudes and knowledge” of defense issues, he states that:

“The civil authority cannot control the military nor supervise the defence establishment unless senators and MPs understand the complexities of national defence and develop expert opinions of their own. The leaders of the Canadian Forces, on the other hand, cannot expect informed support for the armed forces when they make little effort to cultivate senators and MPs who are interested and willing to carry the military’s case to party caucuses and to the public.”

What becomes clear from these brief points is that there is move towards the peacekeeping ideal, but the transition is possibly slower than anticipated and there seems to be a true lack of understanding at the political level of what these changes really entail. It has even been argued by some that the political process has broadened and diluted the peacekeeping policy framework. In what appears to be a confused policy and political context the transition that is occurring has a direct impact on the way the CF is managed at both the macro and micro levels.

**The Management Paradigm at the Macro Level**

The various scandals of the 1990s brought to a head the crisis within the CF of the demands of a duel role capability with limited resources. It is important to look back at a previous war, Richard Gabrial and Paul Savage in their seminal work *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, noted that the US Army per say could not be blamed for all the problems the military faced after the end of the Vietnam War. As they note “reform is almost never anticipatory; more usually it is a reaction against existing circumstance.”

Thus, in reaction to the Somalia incident and so many other stains on the CF, by 1997 the Government produced a report for leadership and management reform of the CF. As the introduction noted the “intolerable events” had “called into question the Canadian military, its leadership, its discipline, its command and management, and even its honour.” The same crisis the US Army had faced nearly a quarter century before.

The report goes on to outline changes and recommendations in the areas of military discipline, values and ethics, leadership, command and control, terms and conditions of service, and transparency to the public. Yet, the Minster of Defence in his opening arguments about the “Role of the CF” moves immediately to a compromise position between the specialization in Pearsonian peacekeeping and
war-fighting capability—thus creating a contradiction with the policies outlined by the Red Book, the 1994 Defense White Paper, and subsequent government statements and documents. The Report notes that the role of the CF lies “between the extreme views” of the peacekeeping force and a war-fighting army and that “combat-capable forces need not possess every component of military capability.”41 It is in this context that the management of the CF is outlined.

If is important to note that the majority of the Report is more about personnel related issues like terms of service and discipline rather than operation needs—of which the document only offers two-and-a-half pages of comments. By 2001, some 300 institutional reforms had been implemented to address various personnel issues.42 What is telling is that the operational requirements discussed are designed more for peacekeeping than war-fighting. Such as “cultural training” the development of “lesson learned cells,” and the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre at CFB Kingston, and further liaison with the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. More importantly, the CF has developed a Joint Command and Control Intelligence System to aid in the planning and running of future missions. This is combined with greater emphasis on joint (involving two or more of the elements of the CF—Army, Navy, Air Force) and combined (involving elements of the armed forces of two or more countries) operations.43 This can be clearly interpreted as a greater emphasis towards training for a peacekeeping mandate for the CF. If one is to read between the lines the issue of public transparency which makes up the final portion of the Report states that the CF and DND “will take measures to increase transparency, responsiveness, accessibility and accuracy” regarding information about the CF.44 This level of openness though valuable, is not in keeping with a traditional war-fighting role for a military entity.

Taking the report to the PM in context with the Defence Performance and Outlook 2000 booklet, one cannot but see the linkages that are moving the CF towards a more benign peacekeeping mode of operating. Page after page of this document is filled with statements that indicate a peacekeeping mode for the CF, statements such as “the Canadian Forces have demonstrated the breadth of the contributions to international peace, stability and human security that Canada can make with multi-purpose, combat capable forces,”45 —this is not a war-fighting capability!

This subtle move towards a peacekeeping force is then reinforced by Strategy 2020 statements like “Canadian defence planning is now based upon the capabilities Canada needs to protect and promote its interests and values in a responsive manner, rather than upon direct threats to our well being.”46 It is clear that DND is not talking about a war-fighting scenario.

Modern management, is another subtle indication of the road that DND is taking, by focusing on human resources comptrollership, information management, and integrated management. This has been done in an effort to integrate the existing management initiatives within the CF to rationalize planning, management and comptrollership in the CF. The following statement from the DND Finance and Corporate Services shows a distinct move away from soldiering to management, “In June 1997, another important step was taken when Treasury Board became the management board of the Government of Canada. Building on this foundation, the Treasury Board Secretariat publication ‘Results for Canadians: A Management Agenda for the Government of Canada, ’ is a clear framework for Public Service managers.”47 One has to wonder when military officers and NCO’s became “public service managers”? (See Appendix 4).

There are many critics of the soldier as manager scenario, but it was the American military that
has paid the highest price in the past for such management blunders. The very nature of war-fighting does not engender it to being “managed,” as the US Armed Forces found out during the Vietnam War. At the time, one of the first and most vocal critics of this tack was Colonel David Hackworth, who is still the most decorated living US soldier. The writings of people like Colonel Hackworth, Richard Gabriel, Paul Savage, and James William Gibson all illustrate how the managerial approach to war leads to ultimate failure of a military. Thus, one must concluded that if one is planning to have a public service ethos for the CF, then war-fighting cannot be high on the agenda. In fact the management scenario clearly lends itself to peacekeeping—which clearly is more about management than war-fighting.

Tied to these changes is the reliance on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). From the height of Canadian deployments in the early 1990’s to the present limited UN and NATO deployments, the Canadian Forces is now no longer in a position to support policy due to its limited and ever dwindling military capabilities—which is reflected in the falling numbers of troops on UN missions. Operations have been reduced to the concept of “first in, first out” as illustrated by Canada’s recent participation in missions to Kosovo, Ethiopia/Eritrea and East Timor.

In an effort to counter critics the new mantra of DND has become the reliance on technology to resolve the low personnel levels and limited expenditures on new equipment. This new concept is called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and is defined as:

*a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by advances in military technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and organizational concepts fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.*

Canadian Vice Admiral Gary Garnet, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, noted that RMA is taking place in an environment where “innovation will take place regardless of contrary views or limited budgets. The challenge that we face is to choose wisely and exploit affordable and effective technological, doctrinal and organizational change.” A problem arises with RMA due to Canada’s strong bilateral defence links with the US. DND’s vision is driven by an American ideal of RMA that presently is directed at high intensity warfare and threats to vital interests, but as Commodore Daniel McNeil, the Director Force Planning and Program Coordination at NDHQ states, “the bulk of CF military deployments over the last ten years [1990-2000] were peace support operations to check offences against our core values and ethics.” These were not “high intensity warfare” or “threats to vital interests,” making RMA an obvious contradiction between policy and actual operations. At the end of the day the RMA is fundamentally built on the belief that technology can fill the gap of lower budgets and lower manning levels in the CF.

As noted earlier the RMA model is linked with Modern Management, which according to the CF is an amalgam of existing initiatives that have been integrated in a “comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership.” This system will focus on four main areas (1) human resources, (2) comptrollership, (3) information management, and (4) integrated management. Modern Management, RMA and the scandals of the 1990s have brought the ideas of New Public Management into the forefront of DND policy as outlined in-depth in the Final Report (1999) of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. The Committee’s report noted that their suggested reforms “involves profound cultural
change” in the CF. That “new” or “re-discovered” values like accountability, self-examination and self-improvement, fairness and openness are needed. 55

Modern Management, RMA and any other defence expenditures come at a price and as most defence related decisions are about equipment purchases the PM, the PMO, and the PCO have a vested interest given the impact on the government’s overall budget. Thus, initiatives like Modern Management have been implemented and buzz words like “maximizing value-for-money” abound in DND literature. But as the Auditor General points out, the defence budget has been over stretched and the lack of efficiency due to inadequate planning tools “meant that not enough funds were being freed up inside the Department.” 56 Thus there was no real ability to maximize funds. DND’s future vision of the CF has at least acknowledged that “defence must put the human resource needs of the institution- military and civilian alike- first.” 57 But in 2001 the CF’s organizational structure (see Appendix 5) has serious management flaws, in that it has a dual command and control system making generals into bureaucrats. This combined with endemic underfunding has created an entity where “the politicizing of senior commanders, anti-intellectualism, and public service mentality have lead to complete failure to lead” 58 leaving the CF barely operational and unable to fulfil foreign or defence policy goals. Thus we are in fact seeing the same problems that faced the US military establishment at the end of the Vietnam era.

Management at the Micro Level

John Ralston Saul noted that in relation to traditional war scenarios as depicted by the great battles of World War II, conflict in the post-War years has degraded into fights between small low tech military and para-military forces, while the major powers have continued to develop highly sophisticated military machines that are “incapable of fighting real modern wars.” 59 So is there even a need to have a typical war-fighting capability as depicted by the doctrines of the Cold War? 60

Equipment

The 1980’s saw a dramatic change in funding for the CF. An upgrading of most of the CF’s basic equipment was initiated under the Conservative Government. The air force received state of the art CF-18, fighters, replacing its vintage CF 104 Starfighters. The army received the new C-6, and C-7 small arms replacing the FN series of assault rifles from the 1950’s. New light 4x4’s and medium cargo trucks were introduced to replace vehicles from the 1950’s and 60’s. By the mid 1990’s, under a Liberal government, helicopters, frigates, new trucks, and new communications equipment were coming on-line. But these changes are normal for a modern military which has to replace old equipment, yet key heavy weapons systems were not upgraded due to the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe, force reduction plans, and the ubiquitous budget cuts.

Canadian armored forces still use the obsolete Leopard Mk 1 Main battle tank. The Canadian infantry still use the obsolete Carl Gustav anti-tank rocket launcher, our anti-aircraft artillery has limited capabilities, and most of the field and mobile artillery are either obsolete or reaching the end of their useful life. Armored personnel carriers are obsolete, or inadequate for the tasks assigned to them.

Obviously, not replacing and only upgrading this equipment— primarily the Leopard Main Battle Tanks clearly limits the real war-fighting capability of the CF. The recent Report on Plans and Priorities states that as part of the optimization of the CF’s force structure there will be an emphasis on medium weight mechanized forces. 61 This is a clear indication that war-fighting is not a priority for
DND or the Government as modern land warfare doctrine requires tanks as a mainstay of any military force.

This has been reinforced by the replacement of the obsolete tracked M113 and wheeled Bison, Cougar and Grizzly series of APCs with the new wheeled generation of Light Armored Vehicles (the LAV III and Coyote reconnaissance vehicle) which are designed for light military operations. These vehicles are clearly suited for peacekeeping rather than war-fighting. Even the US Army has acknowledged that they require lighter equipment like the LAV III (which they are purchasing as interim equipment) to have rapidly deployable forces within the context of the RMA, thus peacekeeping.

Tanks and APC’s aside, there is the issue of the personal equipment worn and carried by the soldier. Though the CF has made efforts to keep-up, by the mid-1990s combat uniforms were obsolete (first in use in the mid-1950's), to the extent that ammunition magazine pockets were designed to hold the old FNC1 assault rifle, which had been replaced in the mid to late 1980's by the C-7 and C-9 (Canadian variant of the US M-16). The body harness of the 1982 pattern webbing was not conducive to operations in hot climates, causing chafing due to a build-up of sweat when in use. The field pack due to its low center of gravity, was more inclined to damage a soldiers back than help carry his or her equipment. Many troops had purchased the older style hollow frame rucksacks from surplus stores to avoid using the 1982 pattern field pack. The standard combat boots were cheap and had changed little from their WW2 and Korean War patterns. The standard field cap was inadequate for most operational theaters. Cold weather equipment though extremely good, was obsolete given the availability of new light weight materials like Gortex® or Thinsulate®.

The 1996 initiation of the ‘Cloth-the-Soldier’ program has addressed many of the personal equipment issues, regular units should be equipped by 2001-2002 and all personnel will be equipped by 2003. There are 24 integrated components that are designed for army operations, this includes the new Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT) camouflage combat clothing. and as the Minister of Defense stated, “The Government of Canada is committed to providing the Canadian Forces with the clothing and equipment they need to operate effectively.”66 As the Annual Report of the CDS notes “Land Force personnel must be clothed and equipped to conduct war and operations-other-than-war world-wide, year-round and in all types of weather conditions.”67 The tacit acknowledgment of ‘other-than-war’ scenarios indicates the CF command understands that the present upgrades are functions of peacekeeping and peace support operations.

What of the changes since the heady days of the 1980's? The CF-18's are reaching the end of their useful operational life, the frigates have been delivered, the anti-submarine helicopters were canceled and might be replaced with the a downgraded version of the same model, while the Army has received new helicopters, but search and rescue crews still fly aircraft that are older than the crews manning them. The new Tactical Communications and Command System (TCCS) has taken 20 years to be developed and implemented, the CF is only just finished getting this equipment. The new light trucks (LSVWs) have proven to be inadequate to the basic tasks required of them. There is a limited ammunition supply. Our air transport capability is limited and the aircraft are old, as illustrated by the aborted missions to East Timor.

There are inadequate intelligence, medical and logistical support resources and capabilities within the CF, as was illustrated by the events in Somalia and more recently Operation Assurance, in
Zaire. This brief list does not even consider the shortfall of qualified personnel to man Canada’s military or peacekeeping potential. Of the manning ceiling of 60,000 personnel, the CF presently has approximately 58,000 personnel in uniform in the regular force as of 2001.

The Soldiers

Leadership, since the Somalia incident, has become a key issue within the CF. The unquestionable evidence that some officers were willing to blame subordinates to evade castigation for their own behavior; the cover-ups through ‘disappearance’ of documents at NDHQ and elsewhere; the resignation of a defense minister, senior commanders, and the CDS due to the Somalia Inquiry and subsequent revelations about misconduct, racism, and sexism in the armed forces has defined an institution in crisis. These problems can in part be traced to the unification crisis of the second half of the 1960’s and the white, male dominated culture of the CF.

The elimination of the Canadian Forces Headquarters and its replacement with National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ), which has an integrated civilian and military staff structure. This duel command structure has turned military commanders into bureaucrats (Generals were made Assistant Deputy Ministers), who seem to have over the last twenty seven years, developed a ‘public service mentality.’

The other factor that must be addressed is that the CF is still primarily a white male institution, that has until recently done little to promote ethnic or gender diversity. Recent revelations of abuse of female personnel and rampant racism are slowly being addressed through the mandatory requirement of the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP), and a recent program to hire female personnel for the combat arms trades in the CF are small steps towards correcting the ethnic and gender biased nature of the culture of the CF. Overall, many of these issues were all addressed in the 1997 Report to the PM on Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces and action has been taken to redress many of these grave problems within the CF.

Due to these larger issues there now exists a problem between the common soldier and the officer core, primarily senior officers. This is reflected in what is seen by the common soldier, through such mediums as the magazine Esprit Des Corps. Senior officers being rewarded in pay allowances, perks, and performance benefits, while more junior ranks were going to food banks, and having to moon light as pizza delivery boys and cabbies. Ultimately this has eroded the underlying requirement of any competent military force—trust between the officers and the soldiers under their command. This factor has been compounded by a belief that the government is no longer truly supporting the CF in its role to represent Canada’s interest, which has led to serious personnel retention problems. This stems back to the issues of inadequate and obsolete equipment, bad pay, bad housing, and over use of limited numbers of deployable troops on UN/NATO operations. Many of these later issues have been addressed in recent years, but the most problematic remains the overuse of the limited availability of manpower for operations.

As the CDS, General Maurice Baril stated, “They [CF members] have answered the call and served proudly, but they can’t sustain this pace [of deployments].” The US military has been a major critic of the whole peacekeeping scenario for combat troops, as noted training for peacekeeping Bosnia led to US forces being “encouraged to unlearn the standard kill-or-die mentality, and had been allowed to neglect their traditional military skills.” It is a well known fact that peacekeeping

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missions by their nature wear out combat units—which tend to make up the brunt of forces deployed by Canada. All units and personnel are effected at some level, as Defence Performance and Outlook 2000 notes “this operational tempo is taking a toll on the entire forces.” Thus, does it not make eminent sense to have a military forces that is strictly dedicated to peacekeeping rather than creating a situation where units need to be re-trained every time they leave and return from a peace support operation? When the US 3rd Infantry Division switched rotations in Bosnia in February 2001, the whole Division was downgraded to the US Army’s second-lowest rating for wartime readiness. Retraining will not be complete until sometime in 2002 to bring the Division back to a war-fighting status—and this occurred after only a 6 month peace support operation.

The loss of personnel through normal attrition and through mission burn-out raises the issue of the general quality of the type of person the CF attracts and eventually recruits. Standard CF recruiting requires a minimum of a Grade 10 for the private soldier. Officers until recently were not required to hold any secondary education, though it was preferred. These basic standards were not in line with an environment that requires technological expertise, professionalism, the ability to deal with politically complex and fluid situations and cultural and ethnic sensitivity. CF standards in effect remained entrenched in the 1960s until the late 1990s, but by the DND’s own admission it will at least a decade before the nature and level of education in the CF changes to reflect the present geopolitical and policy reality.

Research done in 1997 by the historian Jack Granatstein, from data provided by the DND, shows that only some fifty percent of officers had a university degree, while those holding graduate degrees amounted to only six percent. In comparison, in the US, almost all officers have an undergraduate degree, and in the US air force a graduate degree is required for promotion to Major. Some ninety percent of generals have post graduate degrees. As Granatstein refers to the state of education amongst officers in the CF he comments on the “...anti-intellectualism of the brass,” it is easy to understand why recruiting standards had not been raised until recently to reflect the reality of the 21st century. Though the CF indicates that by 2010 “almost all officers will have one undergraduate degree” this seems a rather unclear statement and is also a slow pace of change for a time of such rapid geopolitical and technological transformations. DND has also indicated that another key component of further training will be training for peace support operations. Again we see a subtle indication of the move from war-fighting to a peacekeeping emphasis. But to attract top people you need to offer them appropriate compensation.

Low pay in relation to their peers in the private sector draws top people away from the military. In the Signals and Electronics branch of the CF there can be a disparity of thirty to fifty percent in remuneration between Officers and their civilian counterparts. The same applies to those in the ranks with technical qualifications, especially in the area of information systems. Why would someone stay in the military with all its negative aspects, when they can walk in to a civilian job that offers more, in terms of pay, benefits and life style and has little to no chance of being putting in harms way. This is then compounded by the reality that as the decade progresses and the predicted 2010 demographic decline of people entering the workforce occurs, there will be greater and greater competition for skilled and educated people. Thus there will be a need for the CF to be a competitive employer in this environment, something that Strategy 2020 acknowledges.

Ultimately there are the troops themselves, badly housed, underpaid, ill led, and suffering from the stress and fatigue of what seems to be endless UN and NATO tours due to heavy political
commitments from the government. Some units are seeing their forth and fifth tours in the Balkan theater. Finally Canada’s reserve force is woefully undermanned, underpaid, and ill-equipped. Canada’s military is one of the few in the world who’s total reserve force structure is smaller than its regular military, some 30,000 reserve troops to some 60,000 regulars.

The final force reductions of the CF in 1999 brought the total number of Regular Force military personnel down to some 60,000 persons, a fifty percent reduction in less than forty years. Some 20,000 troops are in the army, the primary vanguard of any peacekeeping or UN mission-- but only some 9,000 of these are frontline combat troops. The Reserve ceiling was set at some 18,500 troops, it presently stands at 13,500 personnel. Total DND funding will be just above $11 billion, with a general trend of greater spending on personnel (wages) and operational and maintenance costs, but a severe reduction in capital expenditures. Canadian military will be realistically reduced to a small flotilla of destroyers, a wing of fighters, and one mechanized infantry division. The CF’s capability to support UN, NATO or any other relevant operations will be down to brigade size units that could take up to 3 months to deploy.

What is most disturbing is that many of the problems outlined above are well known and well documented, yet there has been limited movement by government to address these inadequacies of the CF. Without a doubt the CF and DND has certainly written volumes since the 1994 Defence White Paper on how these changes are going to occur and some have even taken place yet it is clear after September 11th that the CF is not really in a position to help in areas of civil defence as the military is simply spread too thin across Canada.

With reduced spending and a continuing reduction in capital expenditures it is unlikely that the CF is going to be a modern high tech military as it faces the 21st century. In fact the esteemed historian Jack Granatstein commented that the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union removed the primary reason for the existence of the CF. Though this may be an extreme viewpoint, it is apparent that the CF is not prepared to face the reality of modern mechanized warfare, thus based on the previous discussion one can only concluded that the CF is either slowly being fashioned into a peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, or peace building military force or it is the path that should be taken.

**The Peacekeeping Blueprint**

The present reality of Canada’s ability to fulfil the foreign policy goals through the extension of CF commitments to UN and NATO operations is becoming questionable. Cracks in the system became evident with the events in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. The recent mission to Zaire (Operation Assurance) has certainly reinforced the perception that there seems to be little consensus on defense policy between the military and its civilian masters.

For all the efforts and clear professionalism of the rank and file of the Canadian Forces (CF), as illustrated by their recent work in relief operations at home, they are ill equipped for the tasks set out for them. From the height of Canadian deployments in the early 1990's to the present limited UN and NATO deployments, the Canadian Forces is hardly in a position to support its limited and ever dwindling military capabilities. Thus it makes eminent sense that both DND and the government use the limited resources and capabilities of the CF in a role more suited to Canada’s Human Security focus— that of creating a highly efficient armed force that is primarily focused on the task of...
peacekeeping, with a limited war-fighting cadre of regulars and reserves. The following is a blueprint for such a force.

**The 21st Century**

What has emerged from this brief discussion is that in the post-Cold War environment the Liberal government has made subtle moves to redesign the CF into a peacekeeping entity rather than a war-fighting force. This process requires the government to develop a clear plan to provide the CF with the required tools to accomplish the tasks of participating in multilateral operations, within the obvious financial realities facing the government in the coming years.

(1) Foremost is the policy framework:

As was discussed earlier, if there is not a belief amongst Canadians, then there certainly is a mythos, of Canada as a peacekeeper. But, the geopolitical reality of the post-Cold War world is not one of a traditional war-fighting role but rather one of a peace enforcer, peace maker, or peace builder (which can be argued as semantics for war). The Human Security Agenda makes the peace support operations the obvious role for the CF in the future. Certainly the so called ‘Axworthy Doctrine’ has indicated a willingness at the highest levels to move foreign and security policy towards this ideal. Some core elements of this are:

- security goals should be focused around human security issues rather than state security;
- soft power is the new currency of international politics;
- military force is of declining utility in international politics;
- NGO’s rather than governments are at the forefront of this new type of diplomacy.  

The use of ‘soft power’ through international development and aid has certainly had benefits to Canada. As a mechanism of ‘soft power’ there is certainly ample evidence of NGO’s having an influence on foreign policy in areas ranging from free trade, the environment, to anti-nuclear policy. But, the unwary must pay attention since no NGO is the same. Variation in funding, philosophy, and lobbying capability means that certain agendas will be pushed to the forefront of policy decision making without debate or control. There has been an explosion of NGO related activity around the world which clearly illustrated the growing influence such organizations have over state governments, thus there is great merit in the CIMIC paradigm given that the CF cannot function in peace support operations without there being some sort of civilian component present. Ultimately, policy should simply and openly state that the CF is going to be a peacekeeping military, thus creating the first building block for the new CF and eliminating the present contradictions of a duel purpose force.

(2) Second is the issue of personnel:

(A) Recruiting standards should be raised;

(i) A requirement for a minimum of grade 12 or an equivalent GED for the private soldier as a basic requirement for entry and a clear willingness to further their education; and
(ii) Officers must hold a valid undergraduate degree, or be in the final year of
completion and show an interest in further education, or be enrolled in a military college program.

This further education is outside of the normal training and trade and promotion courses required by the CF for any trade or rank. It can be argued that the advantages of a better educated soldier is the potential reduction of racism and sexism within the military in the future and the ability to understand and operate in the complex peacekeeping environment of the 21st century. The CF should not be an employer of 'last resort.'

(B) There should be more effort in attracting women (a plan was initiated in 1998) and ethnic minorities to the military in an attempt to change its culture of exclusion and be more representative of the ethnic makeup of Canada. This is something that will take at least a generation to take hold, but at the dawn of a new millennium this would be an excellent starting point.

(C) Pay and benefits should be commensurate to that available for equivalent skills in the private sector. This would not only draw top grade recruits, but also help in retaining personnel. The latter makes economic sense in that the CF has expended hundreds of thousands of dollars to train a person, why lose them to the civil sector and thus lose the investment in time and money. Low pay leads to low morale, which can impact the performance of troops conducting operations. Higher pay may stem the hemorrhaging of the loss of personnel and retention percentages may become better. This could also help when Canada faces the manpower shortages foreseen in the coming decade.

(D) An entrenched policy of skills training and periodic upgrading for all ranks of all branches should be implemented in the area of information technology. If the CF plans to remain a first world military it must have people who can handle the technology. Point (C) must be implemented in advance.

(E) NDHQ should be returned to a military institution, and the duality of a civil and military structure should be removed. Ultimately the government should be responsible for setting the objectives, overseeing the direction, and providing the financial means for the CF to perform its tasks. The military command structure should only handle organization, doctrine, promotion, and the operational aspects of missions set out in the governments security policy. Only discipline should be handled in a joint manner, as recent events have clearly illustrated the inability of the CF to police itself.

(F) Cheap good quality housing and quarters for single and married personnel needs immediate and drastic improvement as it has a direct effect the morale of troops. It also is a strong incentive to remain in the military.

(G) Ultimately the ratio of officers to men should be reduced to 5% to 10%. There simply is no need for a structure which is top heavy with expensive officers.

(3) Third is Equipment:
(A) Relegate heavy equipment (like tanks and artillery) to a secondary role, by transferring the armor role to reserve army armor units. Replacement becomes less important and frees up much needed funds for other equipment relevant to peace support operations.

(B) An upgrade of personal equipment, ie. Combat clothing, combat harnesses/field pack, body armor and boots. This program is under way, 1998 saw the issue of the new kevlar helmets, replacing the WW2 style US steel pot. The ‘Clothe-the-Soldier’ program should to accelerated to equip all members of the regular and reserve elements of the CF by the end 2001.

(C) Replace the Carl Gustav hand-held Anti-Tank system with the US Dragon Weapon System. This will give the CF ground combat forces more flexibility in dealing with the type of threats they could face in a non-traditional war fighting scenarios.

(D) Upgrade, update and expand the Canadian Air Force’s air lift and air transport capability to allow for greater flexibility and mobility of CF airborne and ground forces. Had this been available in Rwanda, the tragedy might have been avoided.

(E) Improve the military intelligence capability of the CF by getting better analysts and relying less on the US, which has led to tragedies like Somalia and Kosovo. Move intelligence to a strategic level. Greater integration between Military Intelligence, CSIS, the RCMP and CSE are required. Spend more resources on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) rather than falling back on technology vis-a-vis the RMA.

(F) Improve and expand the logistics and medical capabilities of the CF for the direct support of humanitarian efforts.

(G) Have a naval landing ship capability akin to the US and their use of the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)-- these are hover craft. The CF should not waste money and resources developing the hybrid Alternate Landing Ship Logistic (ALSL) when off-the-shelf purchases are available. The objective of this would be as proposed by a recent report form the Royal Canadian Military Institute, the creation of a Amphibious Airmobile Expeditionary Unit (AAEU). See Appendix 4 for composition.

(H) Relegate 90% of existing heavy weapons such as artillery and anti-aircraft units to reserve units. Keep a small cadre (2 battalions) of mobile regular force personnel for mission specific tasks.

There are obviously items that cannot be changed or replaced, ie the F-18 fighters, but the CF can reduce the threat of harm to its members by equipping them with best equipment rather than the worse or old equipment when being deployed. In addition there has to be a realistic naval and airlift capability to support the CF in its operations- three months to deploy a credible force is hardly the mark of a modern high-tech military (this off course excludes our rather small Rapid Reaction Force or special forces).

(4) Re-organize military formations
(A) Re-build the airborne regiment and the Special Service Force. Thus there is a solid cadre of personnel for Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2). This also gives Canada a credible rapidly deployable force.

(B) Bring reserve unit strength up to the same manning levels as the regular force. That is 60,000 reserves and 60,000 regulars.

(C) Use complete reserve units on operations rather than piecemeal deployments of individuals to other units and commands.

(D) Tie reserve units to key regular force combat units to create a cadre of extra personnel when needed.

(E) Give pay and training parity to the reserve force personnel in relation to regular force pay scales.

(F) Pass legislation that provides job protection to servings reservists.

(G) Further reduce the officer to soldier ratio—by reducing the number of officers. Even with the reductions, there still is no need even now for 65 general and flag officers.

Conclusion:

Much of what has been proposed is being done, yet it is under a cloud of uncertainty in regards to policy orientation. If foreign and defence/security policy are to remain interlinked, then there has to be a strong military force that is designed for peacekeeping. And given the seeming trend of the present Liberal government to move the CF towards a peacekeeping role, Canada’s policy framework must clearly state that peacekeeping and not war-fighting is the primary role of the CF. There can be no ambiguity.

This does not mean massive enlargement of the CF, but rather fulfilling points all the points above so that the CF can play a real role in the future, rather than that of a second rate military power which has to rely on the support of others. It would seem clear that the CF can continue to play a role as a component of the UN peacekeeping forces around the world if there is the willingness to expend the financial resources to make the CF a credible force. If we are to put our soldiers in harms way, then it behooves us as Canadians to equip them not just with the hardware and training, but also with the policy tools for the tasks that lay ahead in the 21st Century. I leave the final thoughts to Sun Tzu:

“The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the enemy’s moment of vulnerability.”
Endnotes:


4. UN DPKO, Canadian DND.


27. Ibid. p. 27.


34. Ibid.


41. Ibid, pp. 6-7.


44. Ibid, p. 35.


48. The arguments against managing war fighting are eloquently illustrated in these books: Hackworth, David (Col). About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior; Gibson, James W. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam; and Gabrial, Richard and Savage, Paul. Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army.


52. American reliance on technology has a long history, but was really first addressed in books like The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (1986) and Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (1978). The examples of the Gulf War and more recently the Balkans and concepts like “Soldier 2025” have only reinforced the idea that technological advancement will solve manpower and budgetary woes.


60. Dyer, Gwynne. War, Chapters 8-11.


64. Personal interviews, comments and experience.


69. Personal interviews at a number of CF bases between 1996-1999.


73. Defence Performance and Outlook 2000, p. 11.


76. Ibid.


78. DND statistics.

79. DND, see annex 1 for actual commitments from DND 1998 policy paper.


81. A summery of the Axworthy Doctrine can be found in the International Journal Vol LIII, No. 3, Summer 1998 p. 380. See original footnotes.


83. A Wake Up Call for Canada: The Need for a New Military, Royal Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, Spring 2001, p. 18-19.