

THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS/
LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE

Did you Know?



Saviez-vous?



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INTRODUCTION

OUR FORCES

By the end of February 2002, the Canadian Forces had over 4500 troops deployed overseas on military operations, often in circumstances of great danger. Our sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen in Kandahar, Bosnia, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere in harm's way, continue to serve their country with great dedication and competence. Back here in Canada, their comrades in uniform devote themselves to training and the direct support of those deployed and serving in Canada. They deserve our utmost respect and support. As stated by the Commander of the Land Force: "We have too many soldiers for the defence budget and too few for the assigned tasks." The same can be said on a lesser scale for the other elements of our Canadian Forces. The data for this document is taken largely from the CDA study, "Caught in the Middle". Recognizing the tremendous efforts of the CF and their leaders to make the best out of what they have been given, this information nevertheless indicates a serious lack of real support for our people in uniform. This document is meant to be used by dedicated and knowledgeable Canadians out of uniform to brief their fellow citizens and their leaders on this sad reality. As we move towards a security and defence review in the near future, it is hoped that this document will help our troops obtain the support they deserve.

DEFENCE BUDGET

- The annual DND budget is approaching \$ 12 billion per annum. However, up to \$ 3 billion per annum of that money is not available for expenditures on military capabilities. Instead it is diverted to items such as compensation to provinces for natural disasters, pension contributions, quality of life projects, and projects directed by Treasury Board for implementation by all government departments, and which have limited direct military utility.
- Canada spends only US\$ 265 per capita on defence. The NATO average is US\$ 589 per capita.
- Canada spends only 1.1% of its GDP on defence. The NATO average is 2.2%.
- The Auditor-General has identified an ongoing and annual shortfall in the DND Operations and Maintenance account of \$ 1.3 billion. This is the money which must be spent on the CF to allow them to conduct their operations, and to train to prepare for those operations.
- The Auditor-General has also identified cumulative shortfalls in the capital account to buy equipment of \$ 4 to \$ 6 billion in the next 5 - 10 years, and up to \$11 billion out to 15 years.
- The government states in Budget 2001 that it has "invested" \$ 5.1 billion in DND and the CF since 1999. This is misleading. Most of this money was applied to non-military objects, as noted above, or to costs that had already been incurred or designated in advance. What is important is the amount that is added to the "budget base." During the same period, only \$ 700 million of the \$ 5.1 billion was added to the base. Compare

this with the annual deficit of \$ 1.3 billion in the Operations and Maintenance account alone (above).

- To stabilize the CF, and commence a process of rehabilitation to meet 1994 Defence White Paper commitments, would require the addition of \$ 1 billion to the DND budget base in each of the next 5 years – that is, raising the budget to \$ 15 billion by the end of the period.

CF GENERAL

- CF Medical System is presently incapable of providing adequate medical care for military members serving on operations at home and abroad. It is under serious review.
- The CF Logistics System is incapable of supporting the 94 policy operational commitments to combat operations.
- There are insufficient funds for the navy, the army and the air force to maintain training beyond the basic level. There is therefore an erosion of skill throughout.
- Canada rates 25th in troop contributing countries to the UN, behind the US, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands.
- Chapter 6 of the 94 White Paper states that the CF is committed to an unsustainable contingency force of 10,000 and an indefinitely sustainable one of 4,000 personnel commitment. Can we? We are there now. What other contingencies do we expect and what are we doing about it?
- What is our Space Policy in respect of NORAD and our own vulnerability?
- The Regulars are several thousand below the 60K authorized strength and we are similarly several thousand below the reserve ceiling. How do we retain the trained ones?
- The CF have ageing tactical airlift and no assigned strategic lift by sea or air.

CURRENT OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS

- The current CF contributions to overseas operations (4500) are not sustainable on the basis of six-month rotations. To sustain this level of commitment under current conditions would reinforce destabilization and run down an already fragile organization.
- Six-month rotations require a minimum of three times the number of people actually deployed (those in-theatre; those getting ready to go; and, those who have just arrived back). This amounts to 13, 500 people, and exceeds the number of those operationally ready in the navy and the army.
- Troops deployed on current overseas operations have shortfalls in equipment, such as Sea King helicopters, army command and control facilities, wheeled vehicles, and clothing.
- The army battalion group in Afghanistan has only two companies, whereas the norm is three. The need to operate within a cost cap over rode military operational requirements.

NAVY

- The navy will not have enough money to replace its four destroyers at the end of their service lives (2005), having spent millions modernizing them in the 90's, thus risking its major air defence and command and control capabilities.
- The navy, our most modern element, needs \$6 to \$8 Billion in capital funds alone over the next ten years just to maintain its present capability.
- The Navy has tied up ships for lack of trained personnel.

ARMY

- The army lacks the trained people. It cannot crew its new vehicles and has thus scaled down its units, reducing its capabilities.
- “Canadian Defence Policy should accord priority to Land Force when allocating both equipment and human resources” conclusion from Future Defence Policy Forum, Dec2000. See ADM (Pol) documents on Web Site.
- It has been 9 years since last formation level training occurred. The army can only train collectively one third of its battalions per year.
- Reduced unit size and “task tailoring” have caused much hardship and increased tempo in the army.
- The army bears the brunt of most operational missions.
- There is a serious potential demographic shortfall of Senior Non-Commissioned Officers on the next three-year horizon that cannot be corrected with the present operational tempo and size of our army.
- The army has no armoured combat vehicle to support its Coyote and LAV III vehicles and none is foreseen soon.

AIR FORCE

- 80 of the 120 CF-18’s are to be modernized over the next years to render them compatible with allied operations presumably to 2017 (the MND) at a cost of \$1 Billion mainly in the next two to three years. Canada has signed up to continue to be part of the Future Stealth Fighter Program of the US. Funds for this are not foreseen at this time.
- Aurora fleet is to be reduced by four and the remainder will have reduced flying hours; for instance, two patrols a year over the arctic...far fewer than Aeroflot.
- Replacement of the Sea Kings, its highest priority, is still five to eight years away.

RESERVES

- Naval reservists have trouble crewing the MCDV’s.
- No substantive mobilization plans yet exists nor does a clear and funded policy for the army reserve structure.
- The air reserve relies most heavily on retired former regular personnel.
- There is no clearly articulated and funded policy to give substance to the oft-repeated “footprint across the country” role of the reserves.
- The expectations from the reserves of Strategy 2020 are not compatible with a part-time volunteer unsupported by legislation.
- The thrust of our neighbour to the South and the need to be capable to react on the local level across Canada in defence of our own homeland, will increase the need for our under-funded and ill-equipped reserves.

WE NEED TO SUSTAIN OUR FORCES AND REVIEW OUR DEFENCE POLICY