



# **Iraqi Denial and Deception for Weapons of Mass Destruction & Ballistic Missile Programs**



# Denial & Deception Overview

**Denial**

**Deception**

**Selected Methods**

- **Signals Security**
- **Satellite Countermeasures**
- **Camouflage**
- **Underground/Covert Facilities**

- **Disinformation**
- **Cover Stories**
- **Staged Activities**
- **False Installations**



# Iraqi Denial and Deception



## SHELL GAMES | *The Hunt for Iraq's Forbidden Weapons*

### A Futile Game of Hide and Seek

*Ritter, UNSCOM Foiled by Saddam's Concealment Strategy*

First of two articles

By BAYTON GELLMAN  
Washington Post Staff Writer

**N**EW YORK—Scott Ritter had some experience with erased magnetic disks, and he knew what kinds of traces deleted files leave for skillful operatives to exploit. He had no intention of letting such clues survive on his laptop computer, and he devoted some thought to the best way of demolishing its hard drive.

He planned to remove the drive and smash the storage platters beyond repair. But that would amount, he decided, to unlawful destruction of government property. Like so much equipment in use by United Nations arms inspectors, the Dell machine belonged to the U.S. Defense Department. Ritter settled for erasing it with a large industrial magnet.

It was nearly 9 p.m. on Aug. 25. The following morning, Ritter planned to resign his post with the

U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, where he had helped lead the hunt for Iraq's forbidden weapons since 1991. Alone in the commission's nerve center on the 30th floor of the United Nations tower, crouching over files beneath a pin-studded street map of Baghdad, he made a final sweep for the most sensitive secrets of a job no person had held before: United Nations intelligence operative.

Ritter meant to take some of those secrets with him. He had kept U.N. superiors apprised, as best anyone knew, of everything he did. Still, much of his work was improvised and his most sensitive relationships built on personal trust. He did not feel free to share all his leads or sources with any one government, including his own, and certainly not with every member of the world body on whose behalf they had been collected.

The 37-year-old reserve Marine had cause to worry about the security of any records he left behind. The FBI had warned of Iraqi agents on the U.N. journal

See UNSCOM, A42, C6, 1.



Scott Ritter, who had worked with the U.N. Special Commission since 1991, resigned in August.

- “The Iraqi evasion of the UN disarmament requirements was a determined policy throughout the life of UNSCOM.”
- “To Justify the absence of required data or documents, they offered stories that were the equivalent of the “dog ate my homework.”

Source: Honorable Richard Butler, Former UNSCOM Chairman, *The Greatest Threat. Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security* (Public Affairs, New York: 2000)



# Concealment Mechanism Organization Chart





# **Iraqi's Denial and Deception Strategy for WMD and Ballistic Missiles**



**In January 1999, then UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council about a 1991 high-level Iraqi decision to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons**

- Provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks; release only outdated weapon stocks for destruction**
- Conceal the full extent of its CW program, including VX nerve agent**
- Conceal existence of BW program**
- Preserve a cadre of nuclear scientists & technicians; documentation and dual-use manufacturing equipment**
- Maintain a covert SCUD missile force & critical manufacturing infrastructure & development programs**

**Sources:** (1) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government, (2002). (2) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, CIA (October 2002)



# Iraqi Denial and Deception Activities Since 1991



- **Concealment & Sanitization**

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- **Fraudulent Declarations to UN**

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- **Sacrifice of WMD Program Elements**

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- **WMD Facility & Program Cover Stories**

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- **Placing WMD Programs in “Dual-use” Facilities**

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- **Declaring Suspect Facilities as “Sensitive Sites”**

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- **Disinformation**

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- **Staged Tours of Alleged WMD Facilities By Iraqi Ministry of Information**

Sources: (1) David Kay, UNSCOM Inspector, “Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (Winter 1995). (2) Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (US State Department, 23 Feb 2000) (3) Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government, (2002).



# Concealment: Abu Ghurayb BW Facility





# Sanitization of WMD Facilities Fallujah Calutron Incident



28 June 1991

Photo Source: IAEA



“In addition to barring UNSCOM inspection teams from various key sites in Iraq, Baghdad has tried to surreptitiously remove nuclear-related equipment like the Uranium Enrichment equipment (above), from clandestine sites before UN inspectors can tag and destroy it”.

Source: [Arms Control Today](#), Tim Trevan, “UNSCOM Faces Entirely New Verification Challenges in Iraq”, Apr 1993





# Fraudulent Declarations to UN



**“Iraq has not produced any bacteriological or biological weapons. This has been proven scientifically and technically. The equipment which could be said to be capable of producing such weapons has been destroyed.”**

**Source: Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network 1052 GMT, 15 Jul 1992, Text of Letter addressed by Foreign Minister Ahmad Hussein to UN Secretary General, Dr. Butrus Ghali**



# Sacrifice of WMD Program Elements



**150 Boxes of BW-related Documents  
Presented to UNSCOM at a Chicken Farm in August 1995**



**ABU GHURAYB BW FACILITY, IRAQ ("BABY MILK" FACTORY)**



**16 September 1990**

**17 January 1991**



# WMD Facility & Program Cover Stories





**ABU GHURAYB BW FACILITY, IRAQ ("BABY MILK" FACTORY)**



**16 September 1990**



**APPROXIMATE AREA  
SHOWN IN PREVIOUS  
PICTURE**


**17 January 1991**

12a

SZ912387



# Cover Story: Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant




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
# Placing WMD Programs in “Dual-use” Facilities



- **Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, at Al-Sharqat, in the Desert in NW Iraq**
- **British report indicates it will produce nitric acid, which can be used in explosives, missile fuel, and purification of uranium**



# Mosul Presidential Palace "Sensitive Site"



Suspected Command & Control Facility

Palace

Suspect Hardened Bunkers

Hardened Storage Warehouse

Photo Source: UK MoD/EPA/PANews)

(One of eight sites from which UNSCOM inspectors were specifically barred)





# Radwaniyah Presidential site




Approximate boundary of Iraqi declared Presidential Site

The approximate total area of the White House and its grounds has been superimposed to show comparative size




# Denial and Deception: DESERT STORM Legacy

Al Basrah Mosque "Disinformation" Incident  
**Simulate damage to unacceptable targets**





# Staged Tour: Iraqi Method for Discrediting Imagery Evidence of Illicit WMD Activity





# Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility



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# Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility



Washington Post  
11 September 2002



# Staged Tour of Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility



APPROXIMATE SITE OF  
STAGED TOUR



©Space Imaging – Ikonos 03 July 2000 DOD Title 50



# The Current Position 1998-2002

- Iraq has begun renewed production of CW agents (probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin & VX)
- All key aspects of Iraq's BW Program (R&D, production, weaponization) are active; most elements are larger & more advanced than before Gulf War
- Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of CW & BW
- Iraq continues to develop its nuclear program, in breach of the NPT and UNCSR 687
- Iraq maintains a small missile force & several development programs

**Iraq has learned lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation**

**Sources: (1) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Assessment of the British Government, (2002). (2) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, CIA (October 2002)**



# Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program: DECEPTION



<b>CW AGENT</b>	<b>DECLARED BY IRAQ</b>	<b>UNACCOUNTED FOR CW AGENT</b>
* VX	At least 4 metric tons	200 metric tons
G-Agents (Sarin)	100-150 metric tons	200 metric tons
Mustard	500-600 metric tons	200 metric tons

**\*Iraq denied producing VX until 1995 defection of Hussein Kamil**

Source: [Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs](#) (US Government: 13 February 1998).





# Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program: DECEPTION



## CW Delivery Systems

Delivery System	Estimated Numbers pre DESERT STORM	Unaccounted for Munitions
Missile Warheads (Modified SCUD B Al Hussein)	75 to 100	45 to 70
Rockets	100,000	15,000-20,000

Source: Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US Government: 13 February 1998).



# Iraqi Biological Weapons Program DECEPTION



AGENT	DECLARED TOTAL CONCENTRATION AMOUNTS (Used To Fill Munitions)	DISCREPANCIES
ANTHRAX	8,500 liters (2,245 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts were 3-4 x more than declared amounts
BOTULINUM TOXIN	19,400 liters (10x – 20x Concentrated) (5,125 gallons)	UNSCOM estimates production amounts 2 x more than declared amounts
GAS GANGRENE	340 liters (90 gallons)	Production amounts could be higher, UNSCOM unable to confirm
AFLATOXIN	Not Available	Production amounts & time frame of production claimed by Iraq do not correlate

Source: Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US Government: 13 February 1998).



# Nuclear Program DECEPTION



Al Qaim Phosphate Plant &  
Uranium Extraction Line



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Facility Bombed During DESERT STORM  
Currently active

- Iraq's Determination to Acquire Nuclear Weapons Undiminished
- Iraq retains a large Cadre of Nuclear Scientists, Engineers & Technicians
- Iraq Continues to Withhold Significant Information from the UN about:
  - Enrichment Techniques
  - Foreign Procurement
  - Weapons Design
  - Experimentation Data

Source: Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US Government: 13 February 1998).



# Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program DECEPTION



COMPONENTS	UNSCOM SUPERVISED DESTRUCTION	DISCREPANCIES IN IRAQI ACCOUNTING
SCUD-Type Missiles	48	7-20 SCUDS
Mobile Launchers	10	Unknown Number
Warheads	30 CW / 18 conventional	45-70 BWICW & conventional

**Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen SCUD-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650-900 kms**

**Sources:** (1) Saddam Hussein's Iraq (US State Department, 23 Feb 2000); (2) Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (US Government: 13 February 1998); (3) Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, CIA (October 2002)



# Al Rafah/Shahiyat Liquid Propellant Rocket Engine Static Test Stand, Feb 2002





# IRAQI COMPLIANCE Fact or Fiction?

**1997**: “We have fulfilled much of the provisions of these resolutions. Therefore, the problem is not implementing what remains. If 90 or 95 percent or even more of these resolutions were implemented, particularly in the area of weapons, then **what is the importance of achieving the remaining 5, 6, or 2 percent ?**”

Source: Paris Radio Address, 15 January 1997



TARIQ AZIZ, Deputy Prime Minister

**2002**: “It is a fact that Iraq is not producing any weapons of mass destruction.”

Source: Interview with Focus Magazine (Germany), 8 April 2002



# IRAQI COMPLIANCE



**Fact or Fiction ?**  
**September 19, 2002**

**“We hereby declare  
before you that Iraq is  
clear of all nuclear,  
chemical and  
biological weapons.”**



**Source: Letter from Saddam Hussein to the U.N. General Assembly,  
September 19, 2002.**